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Current design and implementation of China’s energy saving policies are 
characterized by multiple, mixed policy instruments and spatially based regulatory 
disparity. The dissertation replies on interviews, firm-level data, and industry-
aggregate data to examine the impact of energy saving policies on firm-level energy 
saving and industry location in China. Case study research, using interviews with 20 
firms in four industries and four locations, is applied to explain firm energy saving 
behaviors. The case studies show that competitiveness and legitimation are major 
motivations for energy saving under the policy influence of energy-saving agreements 
and capacity control and elimination.  
Extending from the case study findings, the dissertation examines on the basis 
of data of firms involved in the Top-1000 enterprise energy saving program the 
factors that contribute to energy efficiency improvements. Empirical results show that 
firms with less expansion and no new products are more likely to fulfill greater 
reduction of energy intensity for both existing and new production capacities. Their 
  
energy savings are driven by the pressure of lower individual and industry profit, 
higher electricity price and more subsidies, but are not correlated with any behavioral 
features identified in the previous literature.  
Spatially based regulatory disparity may direct industry growth to regions 
with lower regulation. Analysis of industry aggregate data from 2005 to 2010 
confirms policy-induced industry location, and indicates that an 11% employment 
loss in manufacturing industries is associated with higher energy-saving regulation. 
The results suggest the need of future policy assistance for energy saving and 
resource conservation in regions with laxer regulations, and for the reallocation of 
labor and production. 
The dissertation complements the literature on the explanations for the energy 
efficiency gap, implications of policy instruments on firm investment, and locational 
impact of environmental regulation. It suggests the effectiveness of combined 
mandatory, voluntary, and information policies designed to motivate firms and 
eliminate behavioral barriers, the usefulness of incorporating market-based policy in 
Chinese energy saving policies to encourage energy efficiency and mitigate 
relocation, and the need for further research into the cost effectiveness of financial 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and research motivation 
Reducing energy consumption in absolute terms or for the same amount of 
services provided has long been an important practice and policy focus in the 
industrialized countries since the oil crises in the 1970s, and is increasingly important 
in emerging economies, too. Along with fuel switch, energy conservation and 
efficiency improvement are also necessary approaches to climate change mitigation. 
Efficiency improvement has helped major OECD countries stabilize their energy 
consumption, which would otherwise have been about 50% more (Geller et al. 2006).  
Here and throughout the dissertation, energy efficiency is defined as goods or 
services provided per unit of energy input, while the inverse of it – energy consumed 
per unit of services or goods – is referred to as energy intensity. Energy conservation 
is defined as a reduction in absolute amount of energy consumed. Energy saving is 
more loosely used, referring to energy efficiency improvement, conservation, or both. 
As a major energy consumer, industrial sector accounted for 37% of global 
primary energy use, and contributed for the same percentage of global anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission (IPCC 2007). The overall industrial energy 
efficiency is low, and large potential for improvement is untapped (GEA 2012). 
Policies have been made to improve industrial energy efficiency and reduce industrial 
energy consumption in many countries. Like for other environmental and energy 
policies, industry response and behavior associated with energy efficiency and 




relative effectiveness and mechanism of different policy instruments, the efficiency 
and cost of certain regulation, the explanations for energy efficiency gap and high 
implicit discount rate, and induced technological change. Such understanding helps 
design more effective and efficient policies to address major issues like climate 
change. While the understanding is ever evolving thanks to the expanding literature, 
empirical research findings are not always consistent and usually contingent to 
specific contexts. Innovative policy designs – such as voluntary programs – and 
policy applications in new institutional contexts complicate the situation. 
 
Figure 1.1 China’s trend of energy intensity and share of world energy consumption.  
Energy intensity is measured in kilo gram coal equivalent per Chinese Yuan 
(kgce/CNY) in 2005. (Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China; US 
Energy Information Administration).  
With an intense industrialization process, China experienced a dramatic 
reversal of long-term energy intensity decrease early this century (figure 1.1). The 
increase in energy intensity and a booming economy combined led to a greater 
increase in energy consumption, and associated GHG emission. The central 
government announced in 2006 an ambitious policy target of about 20% decrease in 
energy intensity share of world 
consumption  




energy intensity in five years, with comprehensive supporting programs. The policy 
programs focused mainly on the energy saving in the industrial sector, because it has 
always been the main source of energy consumption in China (figure 1.2). Although 
the policies did not prevent China from becoming the largest energy consumer in few 
years, the increase in energy intensity was stopped and reversed again. 
 
Figure 1.2 The share of industrial energy consumption in China.  
(Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China) 
The policy design and implementation in China feature a mix of different 
policy instruments, multiple-level governance, and regional disparity, which expose 
challenges and opportunities in research. First, whereas the policy target was 
generally reached, it is not clearly understood how multiple governments and policy 
instruments affected industrial firms, and how the firms responded to the regulations. 
Second, with an accumulation of literature in environmental and energy policy, the 
transferability of insights in policy effects into the Chinese context is worth 
investigation, which contributes to the discussion of instrument choice in 




generalize the effectiveness and efficiency of the energy-saving policy, which may 
lead to better policy design in China and elsewhere. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
With the motivation to understand the energy-saving policy mechanism and 
firm response in China, to examine the transferability of insights in environmental 
policy effect, and to evaluate the cost and broad impact of the current regulation, the 
dissertation proposes three sets of research questions, each of which is addressed by a 
chapter below. 
1. Why do firms embark on energy saving, according to their own motivations 
and the institutional contexts they face? This part of research traces the energy-saving 
practices and particularly the reasons for the practices in 20 firms from four energy-
intensive industries in four representative cities of Jiangsu province, China. It 
establishes an explanatory framework for firm energy saving behaviors contingent to 
the Chinese context, based on case study research and the findings of firm 
environmental strategy and environmental policy effects in the literature. 
2. What internal characteristics and external factors contribute to more energy 
savings in firms? This part of research explores the association of energy intensity 
decrease with different firm and contextual factors, by examining the outcome of 
energy saving by firms involved in the top-1000 enterprise energy saving program 
(Top-1000 program).  
3. Is industry location sensitive to the spatial disparity of energy-saving 




provincially-differentiated, performance-based regulations of energy saving on 
manufacturing employment, based on a panel dataset of 20 two-digit industries in 29 
provinces during 2005-2010. The magnitude of employment loss between provinces 
and between industries is measured. 
 
1.3 Significance of the research 
The dissertation research contributes to several strands of literature. First, it 
complements the current discussion of instrument choice and design in energy and 
environmental policies. While a cost-benefit analysis is highly valuable in this regard, 
other broader considerations of social and political contexts are also relevant, such as 
administrative and political issues, firm behaviors, and multiple and overlapping 
jurisdictions (Goulder and Parry 2008; Gillingham et al. 2009; Anthoff and Hahn 
2010; Goulder and Stavins 2011). Especially difficult is the evaluation and design of 
voluntary policies (Segerson 2013; Blackman 2010). By employing multiple case 
studies, the dissertation research differentiate contextual factors – multiple 
governance, multiple regulations, and market structure – from firms’ behaviors, 
motivations and capabilities, and thereby explain more accurately the effects of 
different policy instruments in a given institutional context. It sets the stage for 
quantitative analyses of energy-saving policies in China, and informs the discussion 
of instrument choice about the conditions under which more efficient policies will 
emerge. The analysis of the Top-1000 program extends the qualitative research by 





Second, the research relates to the discussion of the energy efficiency gap and 
investment decisions. The energy efficiency gap or “energy paradox” – allegedly 
profit-maximizing firms not to exploit all the energy-efficient investments with a 
positive net present value – has long been a research interest. The explanations have 
been well-grounded on both market failures and non-market behavioral barriers (Jaffe 
et al. 2004), but with limited empirical literature and evidence on the latter 
(Gillingham et al. 2009). By combining case studies and firm level econometric 
analysis, the research explores the influence of heterogeneity of firms on their 
behaviors of energy-efficiency improvement, and the effect of policy programs in 
assisting energy efficiency improvement. 
Third, the research complements the examination of the cost of spatially 
differentiated environmental regulations, and particularly the pollution haven 
hypothesis, in the interregional and international trade context. While empirical 
literature concerning the effect of Clean Air Act regulations or the international trade 
or investment flows usually found significant evidence, other literature usually found 
insignificant or inconsistent evidence. Departing from the previous literature, this 
research compares the location effect of regulatory policy with that of market policy, 
explores different measures of regulatory stringency, takes into consideration spatial 
linkages of manufacturing location, and uses a panel dataset that corresponds to the 
regulatory variation across provinces, across industries and through time. 
Besides the intellectual aspect, the research also helps evaluate the 
effectiveness and broad impact of the current energy-saving regulations in China, by 




More effective policy making will help China, the largest energy consumer, reduce 
energy demand and mitigate GHG emission. Large co-benefits can also be expected, 
because reduced energy consumption associate with less emission of pollutants, such 
as particle matters, SO2, and NOx. Understanding the location effect of the policy is 
important too, because the redistribution of energy-intensive industries in provinces 
with laxer regulations, generally the west, will raise the demand for water and other 
resources in those regions, cause a threat to the local sustainability, and reduce long-
term energy saving potential. In addition, the cross-country effect of increased 
regulation may lead to potential carbon leakage and loss in competitiveness. 
Depending on the magnitude of inter-province relocation and cross-province decrease 
in energy-intensive industries, additional policy programs may be needed. 
 
1.4 Organization of the dissertation 
The organization of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter two is a 
comprehensive review of the energy-saving policies in China that affect industries. It 
begins by briefly introducing energy-saving policies in other countries, and then 
reviews individually the policy programs in China. Because multiple policy 
instruments are employed, the policy programs are classified according to the policy 
instruments they rely on. The introduction of another policy feature – spatially based 
disaggregation of policy targets and implementation – ends the chapter.  
Chapter three explains why firms make energy-saving practices in China 
according to their motivations and the contexts they face, based on case studies of 20 




province, China. It begins by reviewing previous, relevant explanations and research, 
and thereby setting up an explanatory framework. The research method is introduced 
next, including research design and strategies, case selection and description, data 
collection, and data analysis. The findings – major motivations of firms, major policy 
contexts, and a refined explanatory framework – are demonstrated. The chapter is 
ended with a brief discussion and summary of policy implications. 
Chapter four explores the association of the decrease in firm energy intensity 
with firms’ internal and external contextual factors, by combining the outcome of 
energy saving in firms involved in the Top-1000 program with the China industrial 
enterprise database. It begins with a brief review of the previous literature concerning 
energy demand and investment decisions in firms. The following two sections 
introduce the data used and empirical specifications, respectively. The fourth section 
shows the results for the factors that explain firms’ energy intensity change through 
time. The chapter is ended with a brief discussion and summary of policy 
implications. 
Chapter 5 examines whether provincially-differentiated, performance-based 
regulations of energy saving affect manufacturing employment in China, based on a 
panel dataset of 20 two-digit industries in 29 provinces during 2005-2010. It begins 
with a brief review of the previous literature regarding the pollution haven hypothesis 
and the cost of differentiated regulations. Data and empirical specifications are 
explained next. Results are then displayed, with one set from baseline specification, 




measures and estimation for nation-wide effect. Similarly, a brief discussion and 
summary of policy implications ends this chapter. 
Chapter 6 concludes the whole dissertation, with discussion of its contribution 




Chapter 2 Review of the energy saving policies in China 
2.1 Energy saving policies for the industrial sector around the world 
Before introducing the energy-saving policies in China that affect industries, 
this section reviews energy-saving programs for the industrial sector in other 
countries, because these predecessors are likely prototypes for the policy-making in 
China, and share some similarities with the programs in China. They help understand 
the policy in China, and the research about these policies help develop propositions 
and explanations for the policy effect in China.  
To foster a policy comparison, these policies are organized by the instruments 
used, rather than the countries where they are implemented. In general, the types of 
energy-saving policies include mandatory regulations and standards, financial 
incentives, voluntary programs and agreements, as well as information and 
technology programs. 
 
2.1.1 Voluntary programs and agreements 
The voluntary programs, particularly negotiated energy-saving agreements 
between a government and industries, are widely endorsed by policy makers over the 
world (Segerson 2013). Other initiatives of similar nature – unilateral self-regulation 
of firms, and public programs unilaterally designed by regulators to invite firms to 
follow standards and enjoy rewards – are less relevant in the industrial energy saving 
context and not focused in the review. The agreements usually cover a period of five 




implemented. Depending on the presence of binding policies or future regulatory 
threat, these programs can be classified as completely voluntary programs, programs 
that use the threat of future regulations or taxes as motivations for participation, and 
programs that are implemented in conjunction with existing tax policies or 
regulations (Price 2005). Detailed programs usually vary in their coverage of 
industries, target-setting, complementary policies, and program performance.  
A typical voluntary program with only threatened regulation is the Long-Term 
Agreements in the Netherlands, with a goal to reduce energy intensity for the whole 
manufacturing industry by 20%. Individual agreements were negotiated between the 
Dutch government – the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Netherlands Agency 
for Energy and the Environment – and 30 industry sectors which in aggregate 
accounted for 90% of the Dutch primary energy use, with most of the targets for 20% 
energy-intensity reduction; the sector associations in turn encouraged member firms 
to join the program by signing a letter of accession, and the participating firms 
covered on average 92% of the primary energy use in these sectors (Farla and Blok 
2002). In exchange for their energy-saving efforts, the firms enjoyed tax rebates, 
subsidies, technology support, and a relief from additional regulations (Geller et al. 
2006; Price 2005; Abdelaziz et al. 2011). The final reduction in energy intensity is 
22.3% (Abdelaziz et al. 2011), and a survey indicates that 27-44% of the firm energy 
savings can be attributed to the program (Rietbergen et al. 2002). A successor policy 
– Covenant Benchmarking Energy Efficiency – requires the energy-intensive 
industries to belong to the most efficient in the world, with the government refrain 




Denmark and the UK both implemented voluntary programs with the presence 
of a tax policy. In Denmark, individual firms can choose to make agreements with the 
Danish Energy Agency, usually lasting three years, to invest in energy-saving 
projects identified by energy audit report and to improve energy-management 
activities; in return, they enjoy a lower CO2 tax rate (Bjørner and Jensen 2002; 
Johannsen 2002). The agreements are found to yield a significant reduction in energy 
demand of the participating firms empirically (Bjørner and Jensen 2002); they are 
considered effective in preventing free-riders , but the search costs and the 
administrative costs are considered high and the diffusion of knowledge between 
firms limited (Johannsen 2002). In the UK, the targets were negotiated between the 
government and 44 industrial sectors, with firms individually signed up within the 
sectors. Depending on the sectors’ choice, the targets were set as either an absolute 
reduction or a reduction in intensity, and either for energy use or for carbon emission. 
Firms and sectors achieving their targets can enjoy reduced rate of Climate Change 
Levy. The fulfilled reduction is much larger than the initial targets, and the overall 
environmental and economic benefits are larger than that from a flat-rate tax, because 
of an “awareness effect” arising from the focus on the potential for cost-effective 
improvements (Ekins and Etheridge 2006; Barker et al. 2007). Such an awareness 
effect, however, is inconsistent with the experience in Denmark.  
In general, completely voluntary programs are considered relatively weak and 
ineffective due to the lack of existing or threatened regulatory structure and strong 
political will (Segerson 2013). For example, no significant difference is found 




Climate Challenge program in the US (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010). An 
exception is Japanese Business Federation’s voluntary action plans, for which 
empirical research shows 7% increase in energy-efficiency investment due to targets 
of absolute reduction in energy use or CO2 emission, and no effect from intensity 
reduction targets (Sugino and Arimura 2011).  
 
2.1.2 Financial and economic incentives 
These policies include tradable emission allowance, energy taxes, tax breaks, 
and investment subsidies and loans. The biggest tradable emission allowance system 
is the European Union Emissions Trading System, which has a positive but at most 
moderate effect on reducing carbon emissions. The experience with taxing GHG 
emissions or energy use is still limited (Worrell et al. 2009). Notable examples, as 
mentioned earlier, are the Climate Change Levy in the UK, which applies to all non-
household use of fuels by their type, and the CO2 tax on trade and industry in 
Denmark, corresponding to around 15% of electricity cost, 23% of the fuel oil cost, 
and 35% of the coal cost. Investment-based incentives – tax breaks, subsidies, and 
loans – are more popular and often used along with voluntary programs.  
Although not as popular as voluntary programs, these financial instruments 
should be more cost-effective than mandatory regulations in conventional economic 
terms, because they can more flexibly engage more channels for emission reduction 
and lead to similar marginal costs of abatement across firms. However, their cost 
savings compared to mandatory regulations vary greatly depending on the detailed 




Particularly, investment subsidies, tax breaks and loans for energy savings may 
encourage excess entry and thereby cause too much savings from technology change 
and input substitution, and too little from output reduction, compared to using taxes 
or tradable allowance (Goulder and Parry 2008). 
 
2.1.3 Mandatory regulations 
Mandatory, command-and-control regulations for energy saving are even less 
used. They include technology mandates and performance standard, which usually 
apply to specific facilities, such as motors and boilers. Examples include the Federal 
Motor Efficiency Performance Standards in the US and the Energy Efficiency 
Regulation in Canada (Abdelaziz et al. 2011). While the mandatory regulations are 
the least flexible instruments, performance standards are relatively more flexible and 
cost-effective than technology mandates at the firm level, because a firm can reach 
the same emission reduction without necessarily using certain required technologies.  
 
2.1.4 Information and technology programs 
Unlike the previous policy instruments which address the negative 
environmental externalities directly, the information and technology programs tackle 
the externalities in technological change and behavioral barriers, which associate with 
the innovation, diffusion, and adoption of energy-saving technologies.  
Information is important for technology diffusion and adoption, because on 




energy-saving technologies, and on the other hand, information flow may lead to 
positive externalities associated with learning by using that benefit later adopters 
(Jaffe et al. 2004). One example of information program is industrial energy audits, 
which are usually provided to small and medium sized firms at a lower price or for 
free, like in Japan, to help them identify energy-saving potentials and adopt 
appropriate technologies in a cost-efficient way.  
There are also positive externalities in initial innovation and later 
improvement through learning-by-doing that spill over from the firm making 
innovations to other firms. Because of the externalities, private firms do not have 
enough incentives to invest in innovation to the level of social optimum. Therefore, 
the government tends to fund research, development, and demonstration projects, 
usually in partnership with the industries, such as in the US, Japan, and some 
European countries (Geller et al. 2006). Support is also given to the adoption of major 
energy-saving technologies, such as the combined heat and power.  
 
2.2 Recent energy-saving policies in China 
Energy conservation policies have been implemented and evolved greatly 
since the 1980s, as shown in Table 2.1. They include generally proposed ones like in 
the national social and economic development plan every five years by the state 
council, and specifically designed ones for different sectors and industries. The 
policies focus mainly on the industrial sector, especially heavy industries, which 
consume most of the energy. Three policy programs in China are worth highlighting: 




top-1000 enterprise energy saving program, and closing outdated production 
capacities. The latter two programs are designed to ensure the fulfillment of energy 
saving target proposed in the first program, and can be considered as part of the first 
program. They jointly encouraged great energy savings in industry. 
Table 2.1 Selection of comprehensive energy conservation policies in China.  
Time Policy 
1986 Interim regulation of energy-saving management 
1990 Plan of energy saving in the 8th five year 
1991 Regulation of grading and upgrading of energy-saving management for enterprise 
1995 Plan of energy saving in the 9th five year 
1996 Regulation of technological innovation projects of energy saving and utilization 
1996 Regulation of supervision of energy saving of the ministry of coal industry 
1997 Law of the People's Republic of China on Energy Conservation 
1999 Regulation of energy saving of key energy-using units 
2000 Regulation of energy-saving utilization of civil construction 
2001 Regulation of electricity saving 
2005 Medium and long term plan for energy conservation 
2006 11th five year plan 
2006 Implementation measures of the 10 key projects in the 11th five year plan 
2006 Implementation guidelines for top-1000 enterprise energy saving program 
2007 Comprehensive work plan for energy saving and emission reduction 
2007 Revision of the energy conservation law 
2010 12th five year plan 
2011 Comprehensive Working Plan of Energy Saving and Emission Reduction in the 
12th five year plan 
2011 Top-10000 enterprises energy saving and decarbonization implementation plan  





2.2.1 Energy Saving Target and Comprehensive Work Plan 
As the most important part of China’s energy saving and emission reduction 
(ESER) target, a 20% reduction in energy intensity, measured as coal equivalent 
consumed per unit GDP, by 2010 relative to 2005 base was set, first by the Chinese 
Politburo in November 2005 and then officially written in the 11th Five Year Plan 
(FYP) for the National Economic and Social Development in March 2006. The 20% 
national target was disaggregated into provincial targets in late 2006, ranging from 
12% to 22%, through a negotiation process between central and provincial 
governments based on 2005 provincial energy intensities (Price et al. 2011). 
The 11th FYP and the following comprehensive work plan of ESER by State 
Council incorporated and proposed a few programs to guarantee the reduction target 
to be met: ten key conservation projects, buildings energy efficiency standard, top-
1000 enterprises energy saving program, structural optimization and small plant 
closures, appliance standards and energy-efficiency labels, and so on (Price et al. 
2011). The 12th FYP proposed a reduction of energy intensity of 16% by 2015 on the 
2010 base (State Council 2011).  
For industries, the national and provincial energy-intensity targets were 
fulfilled through administrative and voluntary, financial, and information and 
technology measures. The provincial targets were disaggregated along the 
administrative levels into cities and counties; firm-level energy-saving agreements 
were reached between large energy-consuming firms and the local governments 
where they locate; and the fulfillment of these regional and firm targets were linked to 




Financial instruments included energy saving rewards and rebates, tax exemptions for 
energy-saving investment, and surcharges in electricity price for inefficient facilities 
(Zhou et al. 2010). Industrial instruments included product-specific and technology-
specific energy-intensity targets and the elimination of outdated production capacity.  
 
2.2.2 Top-1000 Enterprise Energy Saving Program 
In the 11th FYP period, the Top-1000 Enterprises Energy Saving Program 
(Top-1000 program), launched by the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), set conservation goals for 1,006 large-scale enterprises that 
each consumed a minimum of 180,000 ton coal equivalent (tce) in 2004 in nine major 
energy-consuming industries, including iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, coal 
mining, electric power generation, petroleum and petrochemicals, chemicals, 
construction materials, textile, and pulp and paper (NDRC 2006). The final energy 
consumption of these enterprises was 670 million tce (mtce) in 2004, accounting for 
33% of the national energy consumption and 47% of industrial energy usage (NDRC 
2006).  
The Top-1000 program intends to significantly improve the participating 
enterprises’ energy efficiency, with the energy intensity reaching domestic advanced 
level and some enterprises reaching international or industry advanced levels, so that 
to realize savings of 100 mtce during 2006 and 2010. All the enterprises with energy 
consumption of 180,000 tce in 2004 were included; firms were dropped out of the 
program only under the condition of mandatory closure, bankruptcy, mergers, or 




The energy-saving targets for each firm were preliminarily set by the NDRC 
because of the time constraint, and aggregated for each province. Each participating 
enterprises then negotiated and signed an agreement with its corresponding 
government for the detailed target and energy conservation plan. The main measures 
include energy audit, conservation plan, energy-saving technology promotion, and 
replacement of inefficient production processes. Because the program is seriously 
implemented and the participating enterprises accounted for a large share of total 
energy consumption, the Top-1000 program is estimated as the largest contributor 
among the energy saving programs (Price et al. 2011), and has saved 165 mtce during 
2006 and 2010 (NDRC 2011b). The corresponding program during the 12th FYP 
period, 2011 to 2015, expands to roughly 17,000 enterprises, each of which consumes 
more than 10,000 tce annually, with a goal of saving 250 mtce (State Council 2011; 
NDRC 2011a). 
 
2.2.3 Industrial structure adjustment and outdated capacity closure 
Like the Top-1000 program, closing outdated production capacity is planned 
clearly and consistently during the recent years. It has been focusing on 13 energy-
intensive industries in the 11th FYP period (State Council 2007), and 19 in the 12th 
FYP period (MIIT 2011). The closure is part of the comprehensive energy saving 
plan, and they are disaggregated into industries, as shown in table 2.2. These targets 
are also reflected in each industry’s development plan, with detailed technology-




specific targets to years and enterprises and serious implementation by the 
governments were required.  
Table 2.2 List of planned closure of outdated capacity.  
Industry Unit 11th FYP targets 12th FYP targets 
Electricity GW 50 -
Iron Mt 100 48
Steel Mt 55 48
Electrolytic aluminum Mt 0.65 0.9
Iron alloy Mt 4 7.4
Calcium carbide Mt 2 3.8
Coke Mt 80 42
Cement Mt 250 370
Glass M weigh Cases 30 90
Pulp and paper Mt 6.5 15
Alcohol Mt 1.6 1
Monosodium glutamate Mt 0.2 0.182
Citric acid Mt 0.08 0.0475
Copper Mt - 0.8
Lead Mt - 1.3
Zinc Mt - 0.65
Leather M standard piece - 11
Textile printing and dying M meter - 5580
Chemical fiber Mt - 0.59
Lead-acid battery G VAh - 7.46
(Source: State Council 2007, MIIT 2011) 
The enforcement is through administrative pressure and energy pricing. 
Depending on the local needs, however, the government maintains some flexibility in 





2.3 Policy features 
Two important features in the design and implementation of the energy-saving 
policy in China are the use of multiple and mixed policy instruments, and the 
spatially based regulation. They are closely related to the research in the following 
chapters, and are explained here. 
 
2.3.1 Multiple, mixed policy instruments 
For industries, the national and provincial energy-intensity targets were 
fulfilled through mandatory, voluntary, financial and economic, and technology and 
information measures. They were sometimes mixed in implementation, and not easily 
differentiated.  
A large part of the policy was enforced through administration and 
negotiation, which is usually neither completely mandatory nor completely voluntary. 
Close to the mandatory side were the elimination of certain production process, 
capacity control, and energy efficiency performance standard, all of which were 
specific to some industries and technologies. The target setting for energy saving at 
the provincial, municipal, and county levels were usually negotiated between the 
higher and lower level government, but without much flexibility. At the firm level, 
the top-1000 energy consuming firms were mandated to commit to energy saving, but 
the detailed amount of energy saving, calculation method, and energy conservation 
plan were negotiable. Other firms were mainly involved in a voluntary manner. Local 




Financial and economic instruments include fiscal policies, tax policies and 
energy pricing. The central government had allocated $41.8 billion CNY by 2008 to 
improve energy efficiency (Zhou et al. 2010). Enterprises making energy savings 
could acquire either reward according to the energy they saved (200-240 CNY/tce) or 
rebate as a portion of their energy saving investment. Energy service companies 
offering energy saving performance contract would get even higher reward during 
12th FYP period. Enterprises making qualified investment in energy-saving projects 
and equipment can receive corporate income tax exemption for 3 years and a 60% 
reduction for additional 3 years (Zhou et al. 2010). These financial incentives were 
also designed to support the mandating and voluntary energy saving in the Top-1000 
program, and the adoption of energy-efficiency technologies.  
Tax rebates for exporters, which had long been used to encourage export, 
were reduced for those exporting energy-intensive products (State Council 2011). 
Differentiated energy pricing was enforced for energy-intensive industries and 
enterprises and facilities with higher than standard per product energy consumption, 
in order to encourage efficient ones and to phase out inefficient ones. 
Technology and information instruments include formal ones such as the Ten 
Key Conservation Projects, which promoted the adoption of ten energy efficiency 
technologies, with the support of financial subsidies through the central, industry-
specific list of recommended technologies, and energy audit, which was required for 
the firms in the Top-1000 program but promoted more widely. On the other hand, 




governments needed the energy saving efforts from firms under their jurisdiction to 
fulfill regional targets, and worked with those firms closely.  
 
2.3.2 Spatially based regulation and variation in regulation stringency 
The energy-saving policy has been implemented in a top-down manner, with 
each level government had its own energy intensity target that were needed to reach 
by 2010. Besides the target, local government was flexible in the policy 
implementation. Because the targets were designed in terms of percentage decline 
based on the former performance, huge difference in the intensity targets existed 
between regions. This encouraged the local government to interpret, design and 
implement energy-saving policies with different stringency levels, which also 
affected different industries to varying degrees across regions. 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the energy-intensity targets that were required to 
reach by 2010 for the provinces. The least stringent target (Ningxia province, in dark 
black) had an intensity level more than five times of the most stringent (Beijing, in 
white). A lower intensity level implies higher production standard and higher cost 
associated with marginal reduction in energy consumption. Therefore, provinces had 






Figure 2.1 Energy intensity targets for province-equivalent administrations in 2010. 
(Data source: the NDRC) 
In addition, the provincially differentiated regulation might also produce 
specific regulatory variation in some industries. Industries have different energy 
intensity levels, as shown in figure 2.2. While in general, energy intensive industries 
should be more stringently regulated compared to less intensive ones nation-wide, the 
same industry might be treated differently in different regions, because its 
contribution to the direction and magnitude of energy intensity change depends on 
both the industry’s and the province’s energy intensity levels. As a simple example, 
the industries on the left side of figure 2.2 had intensity level higher than all 
provinces, and might be regulated by most of the provinces; the industries on the right 
side had intensity level lower than all provinces, and were not likely regulated. But 
the industries in the middle had intensity level higher than the stringent provincial 
targets, and lower than the lax ones, and therefore were very likely regulated to 





Figure 2.2 Energy intensity of manufacturing industries in 2005.  





Chapter 3 Motivations and contexts: Why do firms save energy? 
Under the context of China’s energy-saving policies introduced in the 
previous chapter, particularly the implementation of multiple, mixed policy 
instruments, this chapter explains why firms make energy-saving practices with 
regard to their own motivations. The general research question can be further 
specified into three related ones:  
 What are the major motivations for firms to save energy?  
 What are the major regulatory influences that induce firms to save energy? 
 How do firms respond to the identified regulatory influences according to 
their motivations? 
In answering these questions, an explanatory framework for firm energy 
saving is built up and refined, contingent to the context in China, based on interviews 
in 20 industrial firms and within and between case analyses. The framework not only 
explains industrial energy saving in China, but also identifies important policy 
instruments and institutional agents that influence the process. It on the one hand 
helps predict firm behaviors under different policy instruments and varying 
governance, and on the other hand directs the policy making to more effective ways 
of reducing industrial energy use.  
This chapter is organized as follows. By reviewing two strands of relevant 
literature, the next section proposes a preliminary explanatory framework for firms’ 
energy saving. Section two introduces the design of research method and the selection 




to the three research questions above. Discussions and policy implications are 
summarized in the last section. 
 
3.1 Preliminary explanations 
Two strands of research contribute to a better understanding of firms’ energy-
saving decisions, one from the environmental economics literature and the other from 
the management literature. This section reviews them respectively, and then tailors 
the findings into the Chinese context for a preliminary explanatory framework for 
firms’ energy saving. 
 
3.1.1 Energy efficiency gap and investment barriers 
Industrial firms reduce energy consumption and improve energy efficiency 
generally through management – energy audit, energy information system, training, 
and housekeeping – and technical change – from replacing the whole production line 
to smaller ones like variable speed drives and energy-efficient lighting. From an 
economics perspective, profit-maximizing firms should exploit all the energy-
efficient investments with a positive net present value. In reality, however, it is 
frequently asserted that some energy-efficiency technologies, even if cost-effective, 
are not fully employed in firms. This phenomenon is termed “energy paradox”, or 
“energy efficiency gap”. 
Environmental economists explain the perception of such a gap between real 




barriers (Gillingham et al. 2009; Jaffe et al. 2004). Sources of market failure include 
inadequate information, environmental externalities, broader innovation and adoption 
externalities, liquidity constraints in capital markets, and issues related to energy 
supply pricing and security. Behavioral issues include irreversibility and uncertainty 
in investment choice, bounded rationality, and heterogeneity in energy users.  
In general, these issues have all been considered as barriers that cause slow 
diffusion of energy-saving technologies. Therefore, relevant here is the identification 
of the various barriers in the practical contexts, usually by surveys. Table 3.1 collects 
the top factors identified from these surveys. Following Weber (1997), they are 
grouped as institutional, economic, organizational, and behavioral ones. The former 
two are more related to the market failures and potential policies to correct 
externalities, while the latter two are more related to the behavioral aspects. It should 
be noted that the factors are grouped mainly for the ease of demonstration. They are 
more interdependent and not easy to separate in the real context. 
It can be observed that there is not a consistent set of determinants for firms’ 
energy saving identified across the survey studies. The inconsistency may reflect the 
different research-specific focuses and research designs of the individual researchers. 
Theory-based models or frameworks are usually not used. Therefore, the identified 
determinants are just aggregated together by each study. They may serve for their 
own, specific research objectives and as good indications for future research. But they 
do not enable a coherent understanding of how the external and internal factors 
determine firms’ energy saving, whether for each research setting specifically or 




perspective is the empirical studies about technology adoption and diffusion. These 
studies are reviewed in the next chapter because of their closer connections with the 
second research question. 

































country NLD SWE SWE SWE GRC DEU THA SWE CHN 
institutional          
access to 
capital   × × ×     
information  ×   × ×    
incentive       ×   
economic          
capital 
depreciation ×         
energy 
intensity ×       ×  
cost  ×   ×     
risk  × ×    ×   
time  ×        
payback     ×  ×   
industry     × ×    
competitive 
position ×         
organizational          
priority ×   ×  × ×   
environment 
profile    ×      
long-term 
strategy  × × ×    ×  
size ×       ×  
ownership   ×       
split 
incentives  ×    ×  ×  
behavioral          
ambition  × × ×   ×   
skill      ×   × 
competitors' 
performance         × 
Note: NLD – the Netherlands, SWE – Sweden, GRC – Greece, DEU – Germany, THA – 





3.1.2 Corporate environmental strategies 
The strand of literature in management, focusing on corporate responsiveness, 
behavior, and strategy on environmental and ecological issues, tends to go further 
beyond the assumption of fixed interest in profit maximization and the consideration 
of pollution as externalities and market failures in economic studies. Conceptually, 
environmental and conservation behaviors are incorporated in the concept of 
competitive advantage in two ways. One is Porter’s dynamic view of competitiveness 
and argument for properly designed environmental regulations, which promote firms 
to adopt environmental strategies and innovations that lower costs and differentiate 
products to gain competitiveness (Porter and Van der Linde 1995; Esty and Porter 
1998). The other incorporates the constraints imposed by the biophysical environment 
into the resource-based view of the firm, which not only considers firms’ positions in 
their industries as Porter’s view, but also firms’ internal capabilities to transfer 
resources into competitiveness that are not easily imitated by competitors (Hart 
1995).  
Hart (1995) further summarize three interconnected capabilities of firms’ 
environmental strategy – pollution prevention, product stewardship, and sustainable 
development – that may bring competitive advantage through lower costs, preempting 
competitors, and improving future positions. Based on the resource-based view of the 
firm, empirical studies confirm a positive link between environmental behavior and 
economic performance, especially in high-growth industries (Russo and Fouts 1997); 
proactive environmental strategies build up firms’ unique capabilities for 




and implementation help transfer environmental management into cost advantage 
(Christmann 2000). Other internal characteristics that associate with environmental 
behaviors include managerial perceptions of stakeholder importance (Henriques and 
Sadorsky 1999), their interpretation of environmental issues and discretionary slack 
(Sharma 2000), and their environmental concerns (Naffziger et al. 2003).  
Later research tends to link institutional context with firms’ internal 
motivations, strategies, and organizations to explain environmental behaviors, and is 
more informative to this dissertation research. Bansal and Roth (2000) establish an 
abstract model to explain corporate ecological responsiveness, with three major 
motivations – competitiveness, legitimation, and environmental responsibility – 
triggered by three major contextual factors – issue salience, industry field cohesion 
and individual concern. Delmas and Toffel propose (2004) and empirically confirm 
(2008) corporate environmental strategies as a result of both external pressure from 
different stakeholders – customers, regulators, legislators, communities, 
environmental activists – on different corporate departments, and different 
departments’ influence on managers’ decisions. Williamson et al. (2006) find, on the 
other hand, that environmental behavior in small and medium-sized manufacturing 
firms are driven by regulation and business performance in cost reduction and 
efficiency, but less by wider stakeholders. Child and Tsai (2005) find a dynamic, 
bidirectional interaction accommodating corporate environmental strategies with 
regulatory constraints, rather than unidirectional compliance. The interaction is 
identified between institutional agents and multinational chemical corporations, 




firms. Pulver (2007) explains divergent responses in the oil industry toward climate 
change as a result of oil companies’ different perceptions of profit opportunities, 
which are in turn influenced by scientific networks and policy fields in which the 
companies were embedded. 
 
3.1.3 Chinese context and a preliminary framework for energy saving in firms 
Studies in the Chinese context stress on specific external and internal factors 
that complement the literature above to build up a preliminary explanatory framework 
for energy savings in firms. Particularly, Eichhorst and Bongardt (2009) interview 
three firms in Nanjing, one of the four cities in Jiangsu province where interviewed 
firms in this research locate, and identified major drivers for firms to enter into 
voluntary agreements of energy saving. The drivers include achieving parent 
company targets, enhancing relationship with local government, improving 
reputation, and reducing costs. In comparison to the cases in the Netherlands and 
Germany, the negotiation of voluntary agreements is found to be government-
oriented with weak involvement of industry associations (Eichhorst and Bongardt 
2009), which echoes the findings by Hu (2007) in two iron and steel firms in 
Shandong province. Liu (2009) surveys firms in a few cities in Jiangsu and 
neighboring provinces and finds government regulation, markets, and community and 
NGOs as important external pressures leading to environmental behaviors of firms. 
Zhang et al. (2008) survey firms in a county of Jiangsu and identify that the pressures 
from supply chain and customers and larger firm sizes makes firms more active in 




barriers for firms to practice cleaner production in China – lack of economic incentive 
policies, lax environmental enforcement, and high initial cost.  
In terms of broader environmental policy enforcement and firm responses, 
Dasgupta et al. (2001) find that inspections better improve polluters’ environmental 
performance than pollution charges; on the other hand, Wang and Wheeler (2005) 
find progressive financial penalties, combined with self-reporting and few options for 
contesting regulatory decisions have significant deterrent effect on pollution. 
Christmann and Taylor (2001) find firms with multinational ownership, multinational 
customers, and export to developed counties have better self-regulation and 
environmental performance; Wang and Jin (2007) find that collectively or community 
owned firms also have better environmental performances in water pollution 
discharges than state-owned or private-owned firms.  
Figure 3.1 summarizes the reviewed literature and proposes a preliminary 
framework, which helps develop the research design and analysis of firms’ energy 
saving. A firm makes an energy-saving decision under three contexts: national 
governance, local governance and community, and industrial environment. The three 
external contexts and the firm’s capabilities combined affect the firm’s motivations, 
which in turn determine its energy-saving decisions. In fact, the three contexts are 
interdependent, and all the three policy instruments are applied by national and local 
governments jointly or simultaneously. A simple disaggregation of the three contexts, 
however, helps to direct the research focus to the interface between external 




The national government influences a firm through its enforcement of energy-
saving rewards, tax break, technology mandates, and performance standard. Local 
governments, while having their own commitment to the national government for a 
certain level of energy saving, negotiate with a firm for an energy-saving agreement 
and keep track of the firm’s implementation. Industrial characters, such as average 
growth and competitors’ strategies, also affect a firm’s decisions as the previous 
literature indicates. Finally, a firm’s internal features, such as ownership and size, 
may affect its capabilities, such as innovation and bargaining power, which jointly 
with external influences determine its motivation and decision for energy saving. 
 
Figure 3.1 Preliminary framework of firms’ energy saving decisions.  
 
3.2 Research Methods 
The research objective is to develop contingent, structural explanations of 
firms’ energy savings in the Chinese regulatory context. Case study is the favored 
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accommodated into this research, which means starting from scratch based on 
grounded theory is not needed. On the other hand, the summarized explanatory 
framework in figure 3.1 is relatively general, and does not readily provide specific 
propositions to be tested by more structured and quantified methods. Second, the 
variation of the focused issue – firm energy-saving behaviors – is not an easily 
observable and measurable, and needs detailed, individual investigations. Third, the 
internal and external factors that affect firm decisions are large in quantity, and some 
of them are difficult to observe and measure directly. Moreover, it is sometimes not 
easy to discern internal and contextual factors – for example, to distinguish a firm’s 
own willingness from its response to the local government’s pressure in making 
energy savings. 
 
3.2.1 Research design and strategy 
This research applies a multiple-case design, combining within-case 
identification and process-tracing to establish detailed explanations, and cross-case 
comparison to refine and generalize the within-case findings – testing the main 
findings, excluding plausible alternative explanations, identifying extra factors, and 
making syntheses. Either analysis, if used alone, is not sufficient: a single-case 
analysis is susceptible to selection bias and may lack external validity; cross-case 
comparison relying solely on co-variation may lead to inferential errors and lack 
internal validity.  
A studied case is a single firm, or more precisely the firm’s energy-saving 




firm may have made multiple energy-saving decisions, and each of these decisions 
and the whole processes that can be separately identified is considered a subunit of 
analysis, which adds opportunities for extensive analysis and enhances the insights 
into a single case. 
The first two research questions – major motivations for firms to save energy, 
and major regulatory influences – are specified into alternative propositions to be 
tested to find the relative importance of different motivations and influences across 
cases. Supplementing, grouping, or disaggregating the motivations and influences are 
applied when needed. Following previous research (for example Bansal and Roth 
2000), the major candidates of motivations are competitiveness, legitimation, and 
social responsibility. Competitiveness captures firms’ objective to increase or 
maintain profits through efforts that also reduce energy consumptions, represented as 
pursue of higher profits, lower costs, and larger market share. Legitimation captures 
firms’ objective to follow regulations and norms for long-term survival through 
efforts that also reduce energy consumptions, indicated by an intention to survive, 
lessen risks, and maintain license and government permission. Social responsibility 
captures the social obligations and values represented by individuals or organizations, 
such as individual satisfaction, and employee morale. While the three motivations are 
all significant in previous research, a stronger motivation for legitimation and 
competitiveness may be expected. Strong motivation for legitimation is reflected by 
the previous research of firm ecological responsiveness, and the context in China with 
ambitious energy-saving regulations. Competitiveness follows the reasoning of profit-




The regulatory influences are generally classified according to the instruments 
used as incentive-based ones – tax breaks, electricity pricing, investment rewards, 
subsidies, and loans – mandatory regulations – technology mandates, performance 
standards, and direct governance – and voluntary ones – energy-saving agreements. 
The sources of influences are also identified, as from a local or the central 
government. Greater influences may be expected from voluntary agreements (Bjørner 
and Jensen 2002), especially absolute reduction agreements (Sugino and Arimura 
2011), and from investment assistance.  
The third question – firms’ responses to regulatory influences according to 
their motivations – is addressed by developing and testing alternative descriptive 
explanations for each case, and when possible, descriptions for each subunit of 
energy-saving decision within a firm, with reference to the framework in figure 3.1. 
The already identified motivations and influences are used in the descriptions, while 
other relevant factors, such as firms’ capabilities, are identified in the description 
process. These alternative, plausible explanations are then tested and excluded across 
cases to derive a general explanatory framework that on the one hand explains the 
different cases, and on the other hand links to the literature and concepts.  
Testing alternative propositions and explanations are different in their way of 
using multiple cases. For the former, multiple cases are used as literal replications, so 
that they share a same set of key motivations and key influences. For the latter, 
multiple cases are used as theoretical replications, so that they are explained in the 
same framework, but vary in their specific explanations, because of their distinctive 





3.2.2 Case selection and description 
The selection of cases is conducted to intentionally introduce variations in the 
key factors that may affect firms’ energy savings, i.e. a theoretical sampling. This 
design is especially important because a single firm is not likely exposed to much 
variance in the recent five to six years, i.e. since the energy-saving policy was 
enforced. The key factors in which variations exist are local contexts that may have 
different pressure from local governments and communities, industrial contexts that 
may have different industrial dynamics and different regulations from the national 
policy, and firms’ own features that may influence their capabilities, such as their 
sizes and ownerships.  
The research focuses on a single province, Jiangsu. This guarantees that the 
national policy is uniformly interpreted from the provincial level to the city level, 
whereas there is still enough variance between cities in terms of their own energy-
saving targets, enforcement, and development levels. Four cities are selected – 
Xuzhou, Nanjing, Zhenjiang, and Suzhou, all with a strong industrial economy. Table 
3.2 lists the energy-intensity level, previous reduction, future target required by the 
provincial government, industrial share, and per capita GDP for the four cities, which 
helps to illustrate the local contexts. Xuzhou has the highest energy intensity, the least 
reduction, the lowest future target, and the lowest per capita GDP. Therefore, the 
regulation and pressure on energy saving in Xuzhou is lower than the other three.  
The other three cities are considered with higher regulatory pressure, but for 




made the largest percentage reduction during 2006-2010. More importantly, it has 
already designed a detailed energy-saving plan according to its own target of 50% 
energy-intensity reduction, and negotiated with individual firms for their individual 
targets for 2015, while the other three cities have not. Zhenjiang’s regulatory pressure 
is considered high simply because it has the lowest energy intensity and a very high 
share of industrial economy, and is relatively more difficult to make the same percent 
of reduction in energy intensity. Suzhou has the highest per capita GDP, and has 
relatively less incentives to protect the local industries from energy-saving 
regulations. It should be noted that except for Xuzhou, which is clearly different from 
the other three and still in rapid industrialization, the relative stringency of regulations 
is not directly discernible without detailed investigations.  
Table 3.2 List of case locations. 
City Xuzhou Nanjing Zhenjiang Suzhou 
energy intensity in 2010 (tce/1,000 CNY) a 0.1123 0.1065 0.0779 0.0824
energy intensity reduction 2006-2010 a 19.68 % 21.71 % 20.50 % 20.98 %
energy intensity reduction in 2011 a 3.68% 3.71% 3.79% 3.93%
intensity reduction target 2011-2015 a 18.0% 19.0% 1 18.0% 19.0%
GDP/capita in 2009 (1,000 CNY) b 27.51 55.29 54.73 83.70
industrial share of GDP in 20092, b 52.3% 45.6% 58.2% 58.7%
Note: 1. While these targets are assigned by the provincial government, Nanjing has its own 
target of 50% reduction in energy intensity; 2. The share includes mining, manufacturing, 
utility, and construction industries. Source: a. Jiangsu economic and information technology 
commission; b. Statistical yearbook of Jiangsu 2010.  
Four industries are included in the analysis: cement, iron and steel, paper, and 
chemical industries. Except that they are all energy-intensive industries, they feature 
different national-level regulations and industrial dynamics. Table 3.3 summarizes 
some of the relevant features and regulations. Both cement industry and steel industry 
have experienced serious overcapacity, with detailed requirements to eliminate 




capacity limit in a given region. The regulation for overcapacity in cement industry 
stays more serious after 2010, especially in Jiangsu. In addition, cement industry is 
highly regional-based, relying on local supply and demand, and is highly 
homogenous in terms of the technology used. This makes the regulation in cement 
industry reasonably justified, and can be strategically enforced toward the small and 
energy-intensive firms. The regulation in steel industry is similar, but there is 
relatively less pressure, because less closure is mandated after 2010, especially in 
Jiangsu, and the market is larger in geographical scope.  
Table 3.3 List of case industries. 
Industry Cement1 Steel2 Paper3 Chemical4
National  
production in 2005 (million ton) 1070 350 32.0 -
production in 2010 (million ton) 1880 630 92.7 -
capacity closure 2006-2010 (million ton) 340 195b 10 -
planned closure 2011-2015 (million ton) 250 96b 10 -
reduction of energy consumption per product 
weight 2006-2010  
12%a 12.8%c 18% -
reduction target of energy consumption per 
product weight 2010-2015 
- 4%c 22% -
energy intensity reduction 2006-2010 - - - 35.8%d
energy intensity reduction target 2011-2015  - 18% - 20%d
CO2 emission intensity reduction target 2011-
2015  
17% 18% - 17%d
Jiangsu  
capacity closure 2006-2010 (thousand ton) 5 33500 11622b 503 -
planned closure 2011-2015 (thousand ton) 6 15000 20b 300 -
Industry heterogeneity low low/middle middle high
Note: a. Only for cement clinker. b. Combined capacity for iron production and steel 
production. c. Only key firms for statistical purpose are included. d. Combined reduction in 
the petrochemical industry and chemical industry. Source: 1. Cement industry development 
plan during the 12th five-year; 2. Iron and steel industry development plan during the 12th 
five-year; 3. Pulp and paper industry development plan during the 12th five-year; 4. 
Petrochemical and chemical industry development plan during the 12th five-year; 5. Jiangsu 
energy-saving plan during the 12th five-year; 6. Jiangsu’s planned closure of industrial 
outdated capacity during the 12th five-year. 
Paper industry has capacity closure requirements for some specific facilities, 




capacity limit. The regulatory pressure has been long enforced, mainly toward small, 
high-polluting firms from an environmental perspective. Finally, the chemical 
industry is a highly heterogeneous industry. While several specific processes in it are 
highly regulated and experience overcapacity, such as the Chloral-alkali process, 
most others, especially those with high technology, high profit, and foreign 
investment, are not similarly regulated as the other three industries. 
Besides location and industry, ownership and size are explicitly taken into 
consideration in case selection. After some initial screening, 20 cases are selected, 
shown in table 3.4. The names of the firms are coded to preserve anonymity. The 
composition is relatively well-balanced in cement and steel industries: they both 
include firms under low and high regulations; cement industry includes firms with all 
ownership types and a critical case that is subject to closure; steel industry includes 
firms in all locations and the two main types of technology – the long process using 
blast furnace to produce iron from iron ore and basic oxygen furnace to produce steel, 
and the short process using electric arc furnace to produce steel directly from scrap. 
The lack of foreign ownership reflects the common situation in the steel industry. 
Therefore, cases in the two industries are more useful to develop explanations of 
energy savings that are relevant to the spatial contexts and firm capabilities, while 
cases in the other two industries can be used to test the findings and strength the 
explanations related to industrial dynamics. Also included in table 3.4 are: the number 
employee a firm has, reflecting its size; whether the firm is a branch company 
managed by a headquarter along with other similar branches; the firm’s age since its 




the number of units of analysis, i.e. energy saving decisions, that can be separately 
identified in a case.  
Table 3.4 List of cases studied. 
Code Industry Location Ownership Employee Branch Age Record Units
C1a Cement Xuzhou state 800 yes 9 1 audio 2
C2 b Cement Xuzhou private 300 no 30 1 audio 3
C3 Cement Nanjing private 250 no 30 1 audio 2
C4 Cement Nanjing foreign 300 yes 1 2 notes 1
C5 b Cement Zhenjiang private 500 no 7 3 audios 2
C6 a Cement Zhenjiang foreign 800 yes 15 2 audios 2
S1 b Steel Xuzhou private 2000 no 1 2 notes 3
S2 a Steel Nanjing private 5500 no 50 2 audios 4
S3 b Steel Zhenjiang private 400 no 9 2 notes 4
S4 a Steel Suzhou state 4000 no 50 2 audios 4
P1 b Paper Xuzhou private 500 no 30 1 audio 1
P2 b Paper Zhenjiang state 1400 no 60 1 audio 1
P3 a Paper Zhenjiang foreign 5600 yes 15 1 note 1
P4 Paper Suzhou foreign 300 yes 14 2 audios 7
P5 b Paper Suzhou foreign 550 yes 16 1 note 4
Ch1b Chemical Nanjing foreign 20 yes 6 1 audio 1
Ch2a Chemical Zhenjiang state 4300 no 50 1 audio 7
Ch3b Chemical Zhenjiang state 1700 no 60 1 note 3
Ch4b Chemical Zhenjiang private 700 no 30 1 audio 2
Ch5b Chemical Zhenjiang private 400 no 5 1 audio 2
Note: a. Top-1000 and Top-10000 energy-consuming enterprises; b. Top-10000 energy-
consuming enterprises.  
 
3.2.3 Data collection 
The main data source is firm interviews, conducted in February, 2012. One to 
three interviewees were selected in each firm, according to their knowledge about the 
firm’s decision making about energy savings. They were usually the top managers, 
managers in charge of production, directors of energy management, or directors of 
environment and safety. An interview was usually conducted for around one hour in 
the interviewee’s office, with some occasions in the firm’s conference room. In 14 




detailed notes were taken. All the interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese, 
and transcribed in Chinese for accuracy, which may otherwise be comprised in 
translation.  
In an interview, the interviewee was first asked to briefly introduce the firm, 
and its position in the industry, relative to its direct competitors. Next, the interviewee 
was asked to introduce the energy-saving, material conservation, and pollution 
control efforts the firm has made, and the time for each effort. Material conservation 
and pollution control were explicitly inquired too because initial discussions with 
some firm managers, government officials, and researchers in China revealed that 
these efforts are related to energy savings and are good reference for within-case 
comparison. Particularly, energy saving and emission reduction are phrased together 
in the 11th five-year plan for the national economy and social development. The 
interviewee was then encouraged to describe in detail the process of each practice 
sequentially, the reasons for the practice, and specific criteria in making decisions. 
The main focus was on energy-saving practices. If all energy and environmental 
investments in the firm followed a same decision-making procedure, the interviewee 
would be asked to specify the procedure. Special attention was given to the firm’s 
interaction with government agencies. Finally, the interviewee was encouraged to 
comment on the general practice and performance of the industry, the practices the 
firm should do but did not, and the barriers to the adoption.  
Firm interviews were accompanied by interviews and informal discussions 
with staff in local and provincial governments and government-based institutions 




technology commissions, development and reform commissions, environmental 
protection bureaus, and energy-saving supervision centers. The information helps to 
understand the provincial and local governments’ interpretation of higher level 
policies and their own policy enforcement, and to confirm the reliability of some 
information collected from firm interviews.  
In addition, the company websites, news, and company reports of the studied 
cases and their industries were collected. They provided background information 
prior to an interview, complemented information collected from interviews and 
helped confirm the reliability of interview responses. 
 
3.2.4 Data analysis 
As explained above, the general strategy for identifying major motivations 
and influences in firms’ energy saving is through testing competing propositions, and 
that for explaining firms’ responses to regulatory influences according to their 
motivations is through developing and testing rival case explanations, with reference 
to the preliminary framework in figure 3.1. To assist the analysis, especially to test 
alternative propositions and rival explanations, all the interview transcripts are input 
to the qualitative analysis software NVivo. The Chinese transcripts are directly coded 
into concepts in English, to avoid inaccuracy introduced in translation. 
Different motivations are first coded. The coding starts from more descriptive 
concepts, such as lowering costs, rather than directly using more abstract, theoretical 
concepts, such as competitiveness. If too many concepts are identified, similar ones 




coding starts from cement firms, and then steel firms, because they have more 
balanced composition. The process stops with two to four motivations. The relative 
importance of each motivation is also identified, according to their appearance in one 
case and across cases. A similar procedure applies to identifying policy influences. 
The other contextual and internal factors are coded and maintained at a 
relatively disaggregate level at first. Combined with identified specific motivations 
and policy influences, they compose contingent descriptive explanations for each 
case. Alternative analytic explanations are generalized from the detailed descriptive 
explanations based on more abstract concepts. The explanations are eliminated, 
adapted, or strengthened when applied to other cases. This is an iterative process, and 
stops only when a robust explanatory framework emerges, whose variations 
accommodate all the cases. 
 
3.3 Findings 
3.3.1 Firms’ motivations for energy savings 
The findings for energy-saving motivations are shown first, in table 3.5. 
Competitiveness is the most important motivation for energy saving, and drives all 
firms in most of their energy-saving practices. This reflects the fact that reducing 
energy consumption, compared to other environmental behaviors, is more closely 
related to production processes and operational cost, and the nature of energy-saving 
investment as a profit maximization decision even in the current context of ambitious 




term survival is still very important – 14 firms are also motivated by legitimation in 
half of the identified energy-saving decisions. In comparison, although social 
responsibility is an important motivation for corporate ecological responsiveness, it 
has minor, if any, influence in firm energy-saving decisions.  
Table 3.5 List of energy-saving motivations.  
Motivation Units Firms Case examples 
Competitiveness 48 20  
 operational profitability 44 19  
 lower cost 33 18 C1-6, S1-4, P2-4, Ch1-5 
 short payback period 18 10 C1, S1, S3, P3-5, Ch2-5 
 efficiency improvement 5 4 C5, C6, P5, Ch2 
 market-based incentives 4 4 C4, S2, S3, P5 
 stable energy supply 4 4 C1, C6, S1, Ch2 
 market position 9 6  
 environmental image 4 3 S3, Ch4, Ch5 
 learn from leading firms 3 3 S2, P1, Ch5 
 product quality 2 1 Ch3 
 market share 3 3 C2, S2, Ch3 
Legitimation 28 14  
 compliance with regional governance 16 10  
 energy-saving agreement 9 5 C1, C4, S2, S4, Ch2 
 environmental requirement 4 4 S3, S4, P4, Ch3 
 survival against government interest 4 2 C3, S2 
 compliance with mandatory policies 12 8  
 expected capacity elimination 6 6 C2, S2, S3, P1, P2, Ch2 
 technology mandate 2 2 C2, S2 
 performance standard 2 2 C2, S4 
 capacity closure 1 1 S4 
 environmental standard 1 1 Ch3 
 compliance within organization 3 3 C4, C6, P5 
 employee working condition 1 1 P4 
Social responsibility 3 3  
 response to national policy encouragement 2 2 C1, C6 
 as a role model 1 1 C1 
 environmental responsibility 1 1 P3 
Total 56 20  
 
Competitiveness. The main reason for increased competitiveness through 
energy saving is that the operational profitability is improved. This is straightforward 
because most of the interviewed firms are energy-intensive with large shares of 




mature technologies with quick payback, such as variable-frequency drive and waste 
heat to power. Interviewees from all but one firms explained their energy-saving 
efforts as a way to reduce costs or to improve the efficiency of the whole production 
systems; many of them justified the investments according to the payback periods, 
which are usually within three years, with a few under one year; benefits from policy 
incentives – tax breaks, rewards, and loans – sometimes make the decisions even 
easier because of shorter payback period and investment assistance.  
A particular benefit to firms’ operation is stable energy supply, especially 
electricity. This is because local governments used electricity quota and scheduled 
blackout for industrial firms in order to respond to shortages of electricity supply and 
guarantee residential use, especially in the summer, and sometimes to curb local 
industrial energy use at the same time. The blackouts are costly to firms’ production 
(Fisher-Vanden et al. 2012). By reducing consumption and using waste heat for self-
generation of power, firms can reduce the chance of being interrupted by intermittent 
restriction on electricity supply. One firm also considered the secure supply of coal in 
the future as a reason for energy saving. 
Besides the operational cost-benefit rationalization, firms also invest in energy 
efficiency to improve their position in the industries. Without violation of any 
environmental standard or requirement from the government, S3, Ch4, and Ch5 made 
energy-saving efforts mainly or partly because the efforts might improve their 
facilities’ appearance and environmental image. S2, P1, and Ch5 kept track of the 
energy-efficiency performance or adopted energy-saving technologies of the leading 




improve product quality and reduce energy use through technological changes. 
Additionally, some firms adopted large, new facilities to replace their old, small 
facilities or to merge other small firms, which were claimed partly for increasing 
output and improving energy efficiency. 
Legitimation. The most common form of legitimation is to comply with 
regional governance – to fulfill the energy-saving agreements that firms negotiated 
with local and provincial governments, and to fulfill requirements of local 
governments on emission reduction beyond national standards. Firms may not face 
immediate difficulty in survival once they fail to meet the energy-saving or 
environmental protection targets, but they may incur more administrative pressure 
and be more difficult to sustain in longer terms under local jurisdiction. As extreme 
cases, interviewees from two firms expressed that they would not survive with their 
small-scale facilities or large energy consumption under the local governance, 
because of conflicting interests of the local government in local development and 
energy-saving performance. 
Similar to the response to local governance, firms’ compliance with 
command-and-control regulations sometimes make them reduce energy consumption. 
The most influential one is industrial policies that mandate the elimination of certain 
production technologies and facilities below certain capacity levels. By following the 
elimination standards, firms substitute new, more efficient capitals for old less 
efficient ones. But only one firm eliminated its facility that was strictly below the 
standard, while the other six replaced their old capitals in advance according to their 




reduced energy consumption by using required energy-saving technologies and 
following technology-based energy-efficiency requirements and pollution-emission 
requirements. 
In addition, three branches of foreign corporations, C4, C6, and P5, made 
some of their energy-saving decisions following headquarters’ requirements. One 
branch of a foreign corporation – P4 – invested in a technical change because it also 
improved the working condition.  
Social Responsibility. Only few firms have energy-saving practices that are 
not directly associated with motivations for competitiveness or legitimation, but 
rather with their social obligations and values. Interviewees from two firms indicated 
that the national policy context of energy saving encouraged their decisions. They 
include a branch of a state-owned cement corporation, C1, and a branch of foreign 
cement corporation, C6. The interviewee of C1 also indicated that as state-owned, 
they should be a role model in their industry. P3 considered energy-saving efforts as a 
strategy to climate change mitigation and environmental protection, and pioneered in 
measuring firm-level carbon footprint. 
Table 3.6 lists the number of case firms and units of energy-saving efforts by 
three major motivations and different case features. While competitiveness is widely 
held in all firms and drives most of the efforts, legitimation is more of a concern in 
cement and steel industries, which may reflect higher regulation in the two industries 
with overcapacity. State-owned firms are also more associated with legitimation 
concern. There is a close relationship between the local government and state-owned 




implementation, and in exchange these firms can enjoy more local protection (Lu and 
Tao 2009). More importantly, the top managers of state-owned firms, unlike their 
counterparts in private or foreign firms, have direct incentives to follow policies, 
because they are administered by the government.  
Firms in Zhenjiang have less motivation for legitimation, mainly because it 
has a higher composition of chemical and paper firms, which are less regulated. The 
association between motivations and organizations are less obvious, except that only 
branch firms within corporations considered social responsibility. 
Table 3.6 Number of firms and units by motivation and case feature. 
Case classification Competitiveness Legitimation Social responsibility Total 
Industry  
 cement 6(11) 5(9) 2(2) 6(12)
 steel 4(12) 3(9) 0 4(15)
 paper 5(12) 4(5) 1(1) 5(14)
 chemical 5(13) 2(5) 0 5(15)
Location  
 Xuzhou 4(9) 3(6) 1(1) 4(9)
 Nanjing 4(7) 3(6) 0 4(8)
 Zhenjiang 9(20) 5(9) 2(2) 9(24)
 Suzhou 3(12) 3(7) 0 3(15)
Ownership  
 state-owned 5(14) 5(12) 1(1) 5(17)
 private 9(21) 5(11) 0 9(23)
 foreign 6(13) 4(5) 2(2) 6(16)
Organization  
 independent 13(33) 9(21) 0 13(38)
 branch 7(15) 5(7) 3(3) 7(18)
Note: in parentheses are the numbers of energy-saving efforts and outside parentheses are the 
numbers of firms in each category. 
 
3.3.2 Policy contexts for firm energy saving 
To understand firms’ motivations and decisions for energy savings, it is 




Unlike the direct motivations for energy saving, a policy context may sometimes link 
with energy-saving efforts only loosely. For example, an interviewee might consider 
all their energy-saving investments are driven by a cost-benefit rationalization, but 
admit that without the investments they cannot fulfill the negotiated energy-saving 
targets. In this case, the firm’s motivation for energy saving is solely competitiveness, 
but the voluntary agreement program is still considered in the policy context. 
Therefore, while some policy influences and motivations overlap, additional policy 
influences may be identified in some situation. If a policy mentioned by an 
interviewee does not affect any energy-saving decisions, however, it is not 
considered. A common example reflected in the interviews is that quite a few firms 
enjoyed investment subsidies and rewards as free-riders, and commented that they 
would not change their decisions even without those benefits.  
The policies and regulations associated with firms’ energy savings are 
organized according to the policy instruments used, as mandatory, financial, and 
voluntary ones in Table 3.7. The three types of instruments mainly associate the 
capital structure change, investment, and overall energy saving respectively, as 
explained below. For each policy, only the number of firms it applies is given, 
because a firm sometimes faces the same policy context, particularly the voluntary 
program, in multiple decisions, and an interviewee might not repeat the context in 
each energy-saving effort.  
Mandatory Regulations. The firms’ energy-saving decisions were more 




and less by financial incentives. This is different from the experience in other 
countries, indicating a distinctive policy context in China for industrial energy saving.  
Table 3.7 List of policies associated with firms’ energy saving practices.  
Policy Firms Examples 
Mandatory regulations 14  
 capacity control 10  
 outdated capacity elimination 8 C2, C3, S2, S3, S4, P1, P2, Ch2 
 local capacity limit 3 C4, C5, S2 
 environmental regulations 5  
 local request 5 C3, S2, S3, P4, Ch3 
 national standard 1 Ch3 
 technology mandate 4 C2, S2, S3, P2 
 energy-efficiency performance standard 3 C2, S2, S4 
 local electricity quota and rolling blackout 3 C1, C6, S1 
Financial incentives 8  
 energy savings performance contract 5 C4, S4, P4, Ch2, Ch4 
 tax break for resource conservation 3 C4, S2, Ch2 
 subsidy for energy-saving investments 3 S2, S4, P5 
 reward for energy savings 1 S3 
 loan 1 S2 
 tradable permit 1 P4 
Voluntary and informal approaches 11  
 energy-saving agreement 9  
 local influence 8 C1, C4, S2, S4, P4, P5, Ch1, Ch2 
 provincial influence 4 C1, S4, P3, Ch2 
 government-firm communication 4 C5, S2, Ch1, Ch2 
 national policy background 3 C1, C6, S2 
 
Most mandatory regulations specify the exact technologies to be used or not 
allowed, usually with large capital replacement, investment, and energy-efficiency 
improvement. The most common influence in firms’ energy saving is that regulates 
the production capacity and capital structure in industries with overcapacity, which is 
usually strictly specified with little flexibility to firms. Eight firms reduced their 
energy consumption by capital replacement, because their old capitals were listed or 




firms made ambitious energy-saving efforts and plans, in hope that their new capital 
investment could be approved under strict regulation of local capacity limit.  
While the central government set elimination standards for certain production 
processes and restricted the regional capacities, the local governments were the 
impetus to the capital replacement. By replacing small, old capitals with large, new 
ones more actively than the policy mandates, the local governments can enjoy more 
tax revenues and fulfill energy-saving targets more easily, because firms with larger 
facilities usually have higher profit and energy efficiency. Firms respond to the 
national policy and local interpretations in advance in order to survive or stay 
legitimate. Otherwise, they may be at risk of being replaced by other large firms 
sooner or later, or finally eliminated according to the policy.  
Because of the local governments’ flexibility in policy enforcement, firms 
face varying regulatory stringency depending on the demand of local governance. For 
example, S4 managed to replace its small furnaces listed in the national elimination 
catalog with a furnace right above the required minimum capacity without the risk of 
being shut down, because it provides its by-products – furnace gas and coke oven gas 
– to about 100, 000 households for residential use. In comparison, S2, with larger 
scale capital, faced greater pressure of survival, because it had no such indispensable 
function to the local area, and drove up the local energy intensity, causing difficulty 
for the local government to meet its energy-saving target. Another example is C3, 
which managed to survive while hundreds of similar small-scale cement firms were 
closed in Jiangsu province, by maintaining its energy efficiency and environmental 




of its feedstock. However, it no long enjoyed tax breaks for resource conservation 
after 2009, and was required to suspend its clinker production, partly because its 
energy efficiency, environmental performance and resource conservation practice had 
been more popular in cement industry. 
Closely related to the capital and capacity regulations are technology 
mandates and energy-efficiency performance standard. C2, S2, S3, and P2 were 
mandated to use certain energy-saving technologies, and C2, S2, and S4 had to meet 
the national-level standards for cement and iron and steel industries, in terms of 
energy consumption per unit product and energy consumptions in the main 
production processes. All these firms also experienced capital replacement because of 
two reasons: first, their facilities were old and inefficient, below the performance 
standard and within the existing or expected elimination list; second, capital 
replacement needs to be approved, usually by provincial or national government, 
which is a chance for the administrative agencies or local government that can help in 
the approval process to propose additional energy-saving and environmental 
protection requirements for the firms to follow.  
Environmental control also gives firms not much flexibility in their approach 
to comply, and specifies the reduction of certain pollutants. Because some pollutants 
were emitted from power generation or other energy-intensive processes, five firms 
managed to reduce their energy consumption by replacing their capitals with newer 
ones, or removing the whole power generation facilities. Except Ch3, which stated 
that one of its energy-saving efforts were made for the compliance with national 




were all considered by the interviewees as responses to local governments’ 
requirements beyond national standards. The final regulation is local sporadic control 
for electricity supply, which although not mainly intended for energy saving, affected 
C1, C6, and S1 in their energy-saving decision.  
Financial Incentives. Financial incentives are mainly designed to assist 
energy-saving investments and thereby improve firms’ competitiveness, with more 
flexibility for firms than mandatory ones. The most common market instrument are 
energy savings performance contracts (ESPC), which facilitated five firms and were 
considered by even more interviewees. Through ESPC, a contract is reached between 
a firm and an energy service company (ESC), which usually pays for an energy-
saving investment, guarantees certain amount of energy savings, and shares the 
benefit of saved energy consumption with the firm for certain years, or is paid back 
by the firm through the energy-saving benefit or other ways. Because ESCs have been 
enjoying generous tax breaks and investment subsidies, they have been developing 
rapidly and seeking customers – firms’ with energy-saving potentials – actively. 
Three benefits of ESPC to firms’ energy savings are identified in the interviews. First, 
it provides a financing solution for firms that are not capable of investing in energy-
saving projects, especially those requiring great investment (S4, Ch2). Second, it 
makes firms more willing to invest in the energy-saving projects whose payback 
period is uncertain or long (P4). Third, it informs firms about their energy-saving 
potentials, which are otherwise not apparent sometimes (Ch4). 
Alternatively, firms can also acquire subsidies for their energy-saving 




national, provincial, and city governments. While many firms enjoyed the policy 
benefits, the two policies in fact only influenced the decision-making in S2, S3, S4, 
and P5. For S3 and P5, the subsidies and rewards were made for small energy-saving 
investments in variable-speed drive and energy-saving lighting, which were already 
cost-efficient and made more attractive; For S2 and S4, the energy-saving subsidies 
were considered by the directors in charge of energy saving or environmental 
protection as a way to demonstrate the performance of their own departments and 
make contribution to the firms. The two incentives for investment are not as effective 
as ESPC, because firms need to apply in advance especially for national subsidies, 
finance the projects by themselves, and receive subsidies or rewards later, even after a 
period of operation and an audit of energy-saving performance. Therefore, firms need 
to have financing capabilities and accurate estimation for potential energy savings.  
Another market incentive for energy saving comes from the fact that some 
energy-saving projects, for example the reuse of waste heat, are also qualified for tax 
breaks for resource conservation. C4, S2, and Ch2 all invested in some energy-saving 
projects that also reuse industrial wastes and are qualified for tax breaks. Rather than 
one-time subsidies or rewards, firms enjoy repeated policy benefits from tax breaks, 
which is more attractive to firms as stated by the interviewee in Ch2. 
Along with these policy benefits, there is also tradable allowance for carbon 
dioxide emission implemented by the Suzhou city government for the local firms. 
The tradable allowance was considered by the interviewees to affect the substitution 
of energy source in P4, which is also the only firm identified to respond to energy-




Voluntary Programs. Voluntary programs usually give firms the greatest 
flexibility in selecting energy-saving approaches, and associate with firms’ legitimacy 
under local jurisdiction. Many firms experienced some informal communication and 
negotiation with the government for energy saving, and nine of them considered that 
the energy-saving targets and agreements negotiated with the government influenced 
their decisions. While the formal contracts or agreements were usually reached by 
firms and local governments, four firms in the Top-1000 program with large energy 
consumption experienced some influence from the provincial government. Three of 
the four firms and five other firms experienced influence from the local governments, 
which in turn need firms’ energy savings to help fulfill their regional targets.  
Besides the explicitly negotiated targets and agreements, four firms were 
influenced by informal communication with the local governments in their energy 
savings. On the one hand, local governments have some specific and sporadic 
demand for energy saving or environmental protection, because for example, a 
previous regulatory plan is not as effective as expected. On the other hand, firms 
would like to establish better relationship with the government in exchange for the 
support from the government for their development, or at least to know the regulatory 
trend to act in advance and preempt disruptions to their operation. Therefore, firms 
will take government demand and perspective from informal and personal 
communication into consideration for energy saving, and even propose energy-saving 
plans actively to the government, as the interviewee in C5 stated. The whole national 
policy background of energy saving also encouraged firms, and associate with firms’ 




Similar to table 3.6, the number of case firms by three major policy 
instruments and case features are listed in table 3.8. The cement and steel firms not 
only were more motivated by legitimation as indicated in table 3.6, they in fact 
experienced more mandatory regulations. With lower regulatory pressure and lower 
energy efficiency, firms in Xuzhou experienced few financial incentives and 
voluntary programs. The two policy instruments can be more flexibly implemented 
by the local government, and were therefore more employed in Nanjing and Suzhou 
with higher regulatory pressure. Domestic, independent firms associated more with 
the mandatory regulations, while foreign branches associated more with voluntary 
requirements. This may reflect newer capital and higher energy efficiency in foreign 
branches. 
Table 3.8 The number of firms by policy context and case feature. 
Case classification Mandatory Financial Voluntary Total 
Industry  
 cement 6 1 4 6
 steel 4 3 2 4
 paper 3 2 3 5
 chemical 2 2 2 5
Location  
 Xuzhou 4 0 1 4
 Nanjing 3 2 3 4
 Zhenjiang 6 3 4 9
 Suzhou 2 3 3 3
Ownership  
 state-owned 5 2 3 5
 private 7 3 2 9
 foreign 3 3 6 6
Organization  
 independent 11 5 4 13





3.3.3 An explanatory framework for firm energy saving in China 
The previous subsections present the motivations and policy context that 
associate with firms’ energy-saving efforts. By linking motivations with policy 
context, as well as firms’ internal capabilities and external industry dynamics, this 
subsection provides an explanatory framework for firms’ energy savings in China. 
Specific explanations for energy saving are established for each firm, which are then 
generalized for each industry, and further generalized across industries and refined 
through iterative cross-case comparisons. The internal capabilities identified include 
energy-saving information, technology, financing ability, land, and government 
relation. The external industry dynamics include mainly the cohesion of an industry 
and the production capacity level.  
The general finding is that there are two sets of energy-saving behaviors in 
firms – one related to main capital replacement and one not. They associate with 
distinctive internal motivations, capabilities, and decisions of the firms, as well as 
industry and policy context and local governance externally. The two sets of 
behaviors may exist in one firm because of its capital vintage, which may be subject 
to different policy context. The relationship between industry and policy context, 
local governance, and firm motivation, capability, and decision is illustrated in figure 
3.2. The main motivations and decisions are in thicker frames, and the main 
influences are in thicker arcs, differentiated from regular arcs showing less important 
influences.  
The first set of energy-saving behavior, circled by the dashed line at the upper 




negotiated energy-saving target of a firm, and often both. The final strategy is usually 
the investment in energy-saving technologies. Financing, technology, and information 
capabilities support the motivation, and determine the technology choice. The most 
important capability is financing ability. While less financing ability does not seem to 
influence firms’ motivation for competitiveness or target fulfillment, it sometimes 
makes a firm give up certain energy-saving investment. For example, P4, Ch2 and 
Ch3 all had concern for installing some energy-saving technologies due to their poor 
business performance in recent years and lack of funds, although they all knew the 
technologies were cost-effective. Technology capabilities – previous technology basis 
(C3, Ch2), employees’ previous experience in other firms (C4, S1, Ch5), and research 
collaborations (C5, S3, Ch3) – all make firms more confident about and advantageous 
in using certain energy-saving technologies. Environmental management systems (S2, 
P3), cleaner production audit (C5, P5), and informal personal communications (C1, 
P4) assist firms to identify energy-saving potentials and find certain solutions.  
The industrial dynamics and voluntary policy are important contexts that 
affect firms’ motivations. Both cement (C1, C3, C5) and steel (S1, S2) firms were 
concerned with overcapacity and low profit in the industries. Generally, firms in the 
two industries were keener to employ energy-saving technologies to lower their cost, 
and invested in projects with longer payback period, compared to most of the firms in 
paper and chemical industries, which experienced less competition. For the cement 
industry, local electricity quota and rolling blackouts and national investment plan in 
infrastructure changed the supply-demand structure and greatly increased the average 




and 2011, as identified in the interviews. Even within paper and chemical industries, 
firms with more competition in their subsectors or with less profit in recent years (P4, 
Ch2, and Ch3) were identified with more energy-saving efforts and more motivations 
to lower cost through energy saving.  
 
Figure 3.2 An explanatory framework for firm energy saving in China. 
Negotiated energy-saving targets are important, particular for firms in Suzhou 
with reduction target in absolute amount, firms in the Top-1000 program with more 
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had announced an ambitious target for 2011-2015 and negotiated with firms. All the 
other firms had no concern about fulfilling their targets or agreements.  
Besides the voluntary agreement, multiple financial incentives are also 
associated with the first set of energy-saving behavior. A direct influence on firms’ 
motivation is from tax breaks for resource conservation, but because only a few 
energy-saving technologies are qualified for tax breaks, the policy effect on energy 
saving is not as significant as its effect on firms’ resource conservation efforts.  
More policy influence is indirect, by strengthening firms’ capabilities. The 
most helpful policy to date is the ESPC, which is especially important for firms 
lacking of other funding opportunities and used in both large and small projects. In 
this sense, loans can be also helpful, but it is not mentioned much by the interviewees. 
Energy-saving rewards and investment subsidies, on the other hand, have only minor 
influence, by motivating certain employees and departments as their contribution to 
the firms (S2, P5), and by shortening an already short payback period (S3, P5). 
Indirect influence also comes from the industrial context. Firms in more 
cohesive industries – those with intense and dense formal or informal networks, 
similar technologies, and frequent flow of employees between firms – are more likely 
to learn from each other in energy-saving practice. While interviewees in cement, 
steel, and paper all implicitly indicated that they were in a cohesive field, it was 
especially the case for cement firms – most interviewees reported the energy-
efficiency performance of neighboring firms and even firms in other regions with the 




The second set of energy-saving behavior, circled by the dashed line at the 
lower right corner of figure 3.2, is motivated by the need to survive or develop, which 
requires the replacement of old, small capitals with large, new ones of the main 
production processes. Such motivations and decisions are jointly influenced by 
external regulatory context and internal firm capabilities. Externally, in cement and 
steel industries with lots of redundant capacity, there is strict national regulation that 
mandates the elimination of certain technologies under certain capacities, and 
prevents the capacity in a region from increasing. Because of the regional capacity 
limit, local governments usually follow a more stringent elimination plan, especially 
in exchange for new firms, which usually bring more tax revenues and less energy 
consumption compared to a few small, old firms. Therefore, firms in the two 
industries are more likely under the pressure of elimination. In comparison, the paper 
industry mandates the elimination of certain technologies, but has no regional 
capacity control, and the chemical industry eliminates even fewer technologies. Firms 
in these two industries have less concern for survival and less constraint for 
expansion. However, local government demand for environmental quality sometimes 
also leads to specific capacity elimination or relocation request, which influences not 
only cement and steel firms, but also paper and chemical firms.  
Internally, the motivation for expansion or survival is determined by a firm’s 
financing capability, land, and government relation. As the interviewee stated, C2 
managed to expand with the closure of 19 other cement firms in the same area, 
because they had land, mine, and the support of the local government. In comparison, 




survive with a new kiln with a similar capacity but not in the elimination list, which 
was suspended finally. S4 had no concern about survival with its small furnace just 
above the elimination level, even under high energy-saving regulation in Suzhou, 
because of its important function to the local governance by supplying waste furnace 
gas and coke oven gas for residential use. S2, without such function, avoided 
relocation only after long-term communication with the local government and 
commitment for greater efforts in energy saving and environmental protection.  
While the firms replace old capitals with new ones to survive or develop, the 
construction of the new capitals usually need to be approved by national or provincial 
government. In exchange for a smooth approval of new capitals, firms (C2, S2, S3, 
P2) usually have to use additional energy-saving technologies or achieve an energy-
efficiency level mandated by the local or provincial government. In a similar manner, 
C5 actively proposed to the local government new energy-saving and environmental 
protection plans in hope of having its suspended expansion plan approved. Therefore, 
the second set of energy-saving behavior finally leads to the employment of some 
energy-saving technologies like in the first set, but under a purely mandatory context. 
Financial incentives and voluntary programs have little, if any, influence in the 
decision-making process. 
 
3.4 Discussion and implications 
Based on the research findings above, this section discusses more broadly the 
current policy mechanisms and impact, as well as future policy directions, with 





3.4.1 Current policy impact 
The current policy in China that effectively affects firm energy saving is a 
combination of mandatory and voluntary instruments, and particularly the regulation 
on capacity and capital structure and energy-saving agreements. Combined they 
effectively influenced the energy-saving decision of most of the firms in the energy-
intensive industries interviewed, according to their capital structure.  
Three issues are relevant to this policy framework and worth noting. First, 
because the local government has great flexibility and interests in interpreting the two 
kinds of policies in their own ways, this may cause a significant spatial disparity in 
energy-saving regulations, according to local development stages and energy-saving 
targets. Such a disparity may lead to industry relocation and concerns for regional 
sustainability and long-term energy saving, which is further discussed in chapter five. 
Second, the greater flexibility in local governance may make firms uncertain about 
future policies and market conditions, and are less likely to make energy-saving 
investment. An example is that the production of C3 was suspended by the local 
government only three years after it replaced its major capital, in exchange for the 
opening of a larger cement firm under the context of local capacity control. Third, 
while the two main policy instruments complement each other in general, there is also 
a conflicting effect. The capacity control and local governance in electricity supply 
greatly reduce the output and change the market dynamics, which in turn cause the 
existing firms to enjoy less competition and less likely to make energy-saving 




The incentive-based policies are relatively less effective to date. A major 
reason is that it was not designed in an efficient way. While a large amount of budget 
has been allocated to subsidies and rewards for energy-saving investments, it does not 
help the firms with financing difficulties but rather has been frequently enjoyed by 
free riders who would have invested anyway. In addition, electricity pricing was 
designed according to specific technology and capacity, and should be effective in 
discouraging the use of inefficient facilities. But the design of electricity pricing 
overlaps with that of capacity control and capital elimination, and has been 
overshadowed by the latter – only one interviewee mentioned the policy in a situation 
that did not influence the firm’s energy-saving decision. The free-rider problem and 
the overlapping policy programs that make part of the policies ineffective, however, 
are common rather than exceptions in energy-saving regulations. Examples are the 
insignificant effect of investment subsidies on energy consumption in Denmark 
(Bjørner and Jensen 2002), and the relative targets of voluntary action in Japan, 
whose effect has been overshadowed by the “Law Concerning the Rational Use of 
Energy” (Sugino and Arimura 2011).  
 
3.4.2 Implications 
The major motivation for firm energy saving in the current policy context is 
competitiveness, which suggests a space for both market-based and investment-
focused incentives. Empirical evidence shows the adoption of energy-efficiency 
technologies is more sensitive to the cost of the equipment than to the expected cost 




as an effective financing approach, ESPC has been proved helpful for firms to make 
energy-saving investment. On the other hand, however, investment incentives 
encourage excess entry and exacerbate the issue of overcapacity, which is now 
addressed by capacity control regulations. An introduction of market-based policies 
and the transition from energy-intensity targets to targets in absolute amount of 
energy consumption may help mitigate the problem. Market-based policies may also 
be effective in accelerating the shift to more efficient capitals (Ruth and Amato 
2002), which is now addressed by capacity control and capital elimination 
regulations. 
Important capabilities are also identified as associated with the adoption of 
energy-saving technologies, including those that improve information and 
technology. Firms are more likely to adopt the technologies that have been used by 
other firms and are more certain in energy-saving performance. Therefore, research, 
development and demonstration programs may be valuable in the current context.  
While an explanatory framework for firm energy saving contingent to the 
Chinese context has been established in this chapter, understanding the energy 
efficiency gap, and particularly the decision of energy-saving investment, is still 
important. Firms are heterogeneous and employ different discount rate in energy-
saving decisions – while some interviewed firms invested in projects with payback 
longer than three years, some other firms, especially foreign branches, only 
considered investments with shorter than one year payback, implying a discount rate 
over 100%. An extremely high discount rate may be partially adjusted by policies that 




cannot be easily changed. Hence, the next chapter continues in line with the reasoning 
by examining empirically what firm features associate with more energy-intensity 




Chapter 4 Firm characteristics and energy efficiency improvement 
The previous chapter explains why industrial firms choose to invest in energy 
savings. However, the questions of what determines the extent of firm energy-saving 
investments across firms, and particularly the contribution of internal and external 
factors of firms to their energy saving efforts remain unanswered. By matching 
annual firm level data from the Chinese industrial enterprise database with the 
outcome of the Top-1000 energy-consuming enterprise program, this chapter 
addresses empirically the question of what factors correlate with higher energy 
efficiency improvement in these large energy-consuming firms.  
This chapter is an extension from and complement to the previous chapter in 
two aspects. First, it examines empirically the contribution of the contextual factors 
that influence firm energy savings that were identified in the previous chapter, such as 
regulatory pressure and industrial competition. Second, it explores firm 
characteristics that associate with behavioral and organizational heterogeneity among 
firms, which may influence their energy-saving investments and, particularly the 
implicit discount rate used in these investments.  
Because the major energy efficiency improvement in firms is through 
technological change, the research has implications for the literature of technology 
adoption. By focusing on the firms in the Top-1000 program, which have similar 
access to information, subsidies, and other policy benefits, it is more likely for the 
research to examine whether and to what extent there are behavioral and 




The results of these internal and external factors combined help evaluate the 
policy design in encouraging firms’ energy saving investment, particularly for the 
Top-1000 program and its successor the Top-10,000 program, and generally for 
information and voluntary programs focusing on large industrial firms. The 
significance and magnitude of the effect of these factors on firm energy savings also 
help identify appropriate incentives in policy making.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section 
reviews the literature of the determinants for technology adoption and performance in 
energy saving and environmental protection that relates to this research. The 
subsequent two sections introduce the data used and empirical approach, respectively. 
The results are shown in section 4.4. The chapter ends in section 4.5 with discussion 
and policy implications.  
 
4.1 Technology adoption and improvement in energy savings 
There is a huge body of literature covering technological change related to 
energy and environmental issues. Because this chapter concerns the factors that affect 
the adoption and improvement of energy efficiency at the firm level, the review of the 
literature focuses on empirical research in firms, and excludes the research at an 
aggregate level and based on simulations. Depending on the interested outcome, the 
reviewed studies can be classified as ones concerning the improvement in energy 
demand and intensity, ones concerning technology adoption, and ones concerning 




(DeCanio and Watkins 1998). The literature reviewed in this section guides the data 
collection and empirical approach discussed in the following to sections. 
 
4.1.1 Improvement in energy demand and intensity 
Change in energy demand or intensity level depends on the investments in 
energy conservation and efficiency improvement, capacity utilization and production 
levels, and fuel mix and products composition. Because energy is a factor of 
production, the empirical research usually starts from a production function or cost 
function, although not always in an explicit and strict way. While the main focus is 
energy price elasticity in the literature, the energy demand elasticity of other factors is 
sometimes examined, too.  
Based on energy surveys covering 3762 Danish industrial firms and different 
functional forms, Bjorner and Jensen (2002) estimate the price and policy effects on 
energy demand; they find that both energy tax and energy agreements reduce energy 
consumption, price elasticity is smaller in magnitude for energy-intensive firms, and 
higher value added associates with more energy demand. With the same data source, 
Arnberg and Bjorner (2007) find that both electricity and other energy are 
complements with capital, and smaller own price elasticity estimates compared to the 
results based on cross-section data. Linn (2008) differentiates the energy intensity of 
entrants and that of incumbents based on the putty-clay investment model (Atkeson 
and Kehoe 1999), and estimates that a 10% increase in the energy price reduces the 
relative energy intensity of entrants by 1%. Firm features are explicitly examined in 




sized industrial enterprises in China during 1997-1999 with detailed energy use by 
type, and find that research and development expenditures, foreign and collectively 
ownership, and some industrial and regional contexts contribute to lower energy 
intensity.  
More firm features are examined for their association with environmental 
performance, because the estimation is usually not restricted to the form from a 
production function or cost function. For example, based on survey data of 236 
Mexican firms, Dasgupta et al. (2000) find environmental management, training, 
large size, higher education, inspections, and publicly traded firms associate with 
higher environmental performance. In general, firm characteristics, such as size, 
ownership, human capital, and productivity, and external factors, such as community 
pressure, capital markets, consumers, and regulators, are commonly empirically 
examined influences (Blackman 2010). While more firm characteristics are identified 
in the environmental literature, their implication for this research is limited, because 
environmental performance, unlike energy-saving efforts, usually does not bring 
private benefits to firms directly.  
 
4.1.2 The adoption of energy-saving technologies 
Some literature considers the decision and extent of the adoption of energy-
saving technologies directly, without a measure of the outcome of the adoption in 
terms the change in energy demand and intensity.  
Without explicitly linking to the individual firm characteristics, Anderson and 




for the adoption of energy-efficient technologies in small and medium-size firms that 
accepted free energy audits and recommendations by the US Department of Energy’s 
Industrial Assessment Centers program; plant size is found of no measureable effect 
on the adoption decision, which contradicts to the results of other research. 
Sugino and Arimura (2011) examine the factors influencing the energy-saving 
investment decisions and investment expenditures of 146 large Japanese firms over 8 
years. While their main conclusion is that firms with voluntary agreements for 
absolute energy conservation are more likely to invest in energy efficiency, they also 
find positive association of the number of employees, and no significant association 
of liquidity constraint and R&D with the investments.  
Arvanitis and Ley (2013) also examine the decision and extent of the adoption 
of energy-saving technologies, or in their words inter-firm diffusion and intra-firm 
diffusion, in 2,324 Swiss firms for the year 2008. They find significant differences 
between inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion with respect to associated firm 
characteristics: inter-firm diffusion is associated with high gross investment intensity, 
presence of R&D activities, large firm size, domestic ownership, high competitive 
pressure, more external experience of the technology, intrinsic motivation to adopt 
energy-saving technology; intra-firm diffusion is less associated with large firm size, 
domestic ownership, and competitive pressure, and more with external experience 
and intrinsic motivation. The energy intensity level of a firm is of minor, if any, 





4.1.3 Program participation 
Firms’ decision to join energy-efficiency programs is thought of as a signal of 
firms’ willingness to undertake energy-saving investments (DeCanio and Watkins 
1998). This is useful in empirical research because program participation is more 
easily observable than investments. Decanio and Watkins (1998) examine firms’ 
decision to join the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s Green Lights 
program, which offers technical support to the participants and requires them to make 
all the lighting upgrades that meet a clear profitability test; they find that firms with 
more employees, more earnings per share, more previous growth in industry earnings, 
less expected future earnings growth, less insider control, and some industrial and 
regional specific contexts are more likely to join the program.   
More literature concerns firms’ involvement in environmental programs and 
certificates. For example, Arora and Cason (1996) find that firms with more 
employees, more consumer contact and R&D intensity are more likely to join the US 
EPA 33/50 program and commit voluntary reduction in key toxic chemicals. 
Nakamura et al. (2001) find the Japanese firms with larger sizes, younger employees, 
more export, less debt, and managerial value toward the environment are more likely 
to obtain ISO 14001 certification.  
 
4.2 Data 
There are multiple data sources used in the empirical analysis performed 
below. These data sources are introduced individually here according to the variables 





4.2.1 The performance of top-1000 energy consuming enterprises 
The national development and reform commission (NDRC), as the main 
institution in charge of the Top-1000 program, collected and announced in 2009, 
2010, and 2011 the energy-saving performance of all the participating firms from the 
program start year 2006 up to the year before the announcement. The last 
announcement in 2011 is for the performance of all the firms throughout the entire 
program period of 2006-2010. The announcement includes the initially negotiated 
energy-saving target as well as fulfilled cumulative energy savings to 2008, 2009, and 
2010 for each firm. These data are used to measure the energy saving efforts in firms. 
The direct measure of absolute amount of energy consumption for individual firms, 
however, is not available.  
How the data of initial targets and cumulative energy savings were produced 
needs some explanations, because they are relevant to the decision of the empirical 
approach below. While negotiation existed between provincial government and firms 
within their jurisdiction for each firm’s energy conservation agreement, the 
preliminary energy-saving targets were set by the NDRC for each firm according to 
the firm’s industrial sector and technology level, due to a time constraint (Price et al. 
2010). The target and an energy conservation plan to fulfill the target with annual 
progress were negotiated by the firm and the local government where the firm 
located. A firm could choose from one of the two methods to calculate its energy 
saving, either by energy consumption per unit product or energy consumption per unit 




because it is easier to reach, for example, through the adjustment of the composition 
of the products. The annual energy saving according to per unit output is measured as 
the change of energy consumption per output multiplied by current output, i.e. 
,      (4-1a) 
where ∆Et is the energy saving in year t, E is the total energy consumption, and Y is 
the total output measured in monetary terms. The annual energy saving according to 
energy consumption per unit product is measured as  
,        (4-1b) 
where Qi,t is the amount of product i produced in year t, usually measured in weight 
or quantity. The cumulative energy saving in a firm is the sum of its annual energy 
saving, measured in either way, since 2006. 
While initially there were 1,008 firms involved in the program, firms dropped 
out over time because of mandatory closure, bankruptcy, mergers, or major changes 
in production and energy use. By the year 2010, 881 firms remained in the program. 
They are from nine two-digit industrial sectors: iron and steel, chemicals, electric 
power, petroleum and petrochemical, construction materials (or nonmetal mineral 
products according to the standard Chinese industrial classification), nonferrous 
metals, coal mining, paper, and textiles. 
 
4.2.2 Chinese industrial enterprise database 
The main data set for the characteristics of individual firms comes from the 
Chinese Industrial Enterprise Database, which is an annual survey of industrial firms 












owned industrial firms and non-state-owned industrial firms with annual sales of five 
million CNY or more. While the survey itself may be consistent with a 
comprehensive coverage across years, the variables included in the released annual 
sample vary.  
For each firm, its basic information – name, location, industry classification, 
telephone number, ownership, initial registration time, and number of employees – 
financial information –assets, liabilities, sales, and profit – and production 
information – total output, new product, and export – are covered every year. Unique 
firm identity code and industry value added are provided in most of the years. Other 
useful information, such as R&D expenditure, employee education expenditure, and 
employee composition, is provided in only one or several years.  
Matching the firms in the database across years and with those listed by the 
top-1000 program is not straightforward, because of the inconsistency in the data 
collection process. Two entries are matched if they share exactly the same name and 
identity code. When small discrepancy exists in the name, a match is established 
based on the same telephone number, on the condition that the two entries are in the 
same location, industry sector, and with the similar number of employees. An internet 
search is used for the confirmation of some potential matches – with similar name, 
location, and industry classification, but different identity code – to see whether a 
reform and re-registration happened, which changed the name and identity code of a 
firm.  
Even with extensive search and matching efforts, a large share of observations 




release of the Chinese Industrial Enterprise Database for recent years. For example, 
the 2010 data does not include firms in four provincial equivalent jurisdictions, 
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, and Shanxi; the 2009 data is a subsample with about 25% 
random omissions; the 2008 data does not include firms in the nonferrous metal 
industry. Beyond the missing observations, only two of the 881 firms that completed 
the program are not included due to the inconsistency between the NDRC 
announcements. Finally, the matching produces a panel data set for 2007-2010 with 
481 firms. Figure 4.1 shows the number of firms that completed the program, and that 
are included in the research by industrial sectors. Because the missing observation is 
mainly made by the NBS and not related to the operation of the Top-1000 program 
administered by NDRC, it may not cause bias in the estimation, although caution is 
needed for the interpretation of the estimation results.  
 
Figure 4.1 Numbers of firms that completed the Top-1000 program and those 





4.2.3 Regional and industrial context factors 
Regional and industrial context, as indicated in the previous chapter, may 
affect the motivation and capability of firms to save energy and make investments. In 
addition, some variables are not available at the firm level, and can only be measured 
by aggregate proxies, such as electricity prices and knowledge spillovers. The data 
source includes China Statistical Yearbooks, China Industry Economy Statistical 
Yearbooks, and China Energy Statistical Yearbooks made by the NBS, the State 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), and the NDRC. 
Regional context is mainly reflected here by policy influences and regional 
endowment, such as general regulation pressure, development level, knowledge 
spillovers, electricity price, and electricity supply. Regulatory pressure directly comes 
from the provincial energy-saving targets that need to be fulfilled by 2010, in terms of 
both absolute energy-intensity levels and percentage declines, which are reported by 
the NDRC. In addition, more developed regions may be less dependent on local 
energy-intensive industries, and consider the environment with a higher value, both of 
which motivate the local government to regulate industrial energy saving more 
stringently. Variables concerning local development, such as per capita GDP and 
fiscal expenditures, can be found in the China Statistical Yearbooks for provinces, 
and in the China City Statistical Yearbooks for cities. Fiscal expenditures also reflect 
the capability for the local government to provide subsidies and rewards. Besides the 
direct impact, more involved firms within a province may foster the spread of 




network structure among the firms is not available, the number of firms within a 
province may be a proxy for such knowledge spillovers.  
There are six major regional electricity grids in China, each covering several 
provinces, and electricity supply and price data are available at the provincial level. 
Provincial electricity production and consumption data is recorded in the China 
Energy Statistical Yearbooks. The ratio of electricity consumption relative to 
consumption in a province reflects the scarcity of electricity supply, and the 
likelihood of local electricity quota and rolling blackout that influence firms. 
Provincial weighted electricity price after 2007 can be calculated from the annual 
Supervising Reports of Electricity Pricing by the SERC, by combining of the 
provincial weighted average sales prices and provincial surcharges.  
Industrial context generally concerns the competition within an industry. 
Competition is measured by the average profit rate and the percentage of loss-making 
firms, which can be calculated from the China Industry Economy Statistical 
Yearbooks. In addition, a more homogeneous industry may also face greater 
competition, because firms are less likely to improve competitiveness through 
differentiation. Such homogeneity is measured by the relative standard deviation of 
profit rates and outputs of the involved firms within the same sector. The petroleum 
and petrochemical industries are in fact two industrial sectors, but because they are 
closely interdependent and treated as one industry by the NDRC, the industrial 





4.3 Empirical approach 
Because the NDRC only reported the initial energy-saving targets and 
cumulative energy saving from 2006 to 2008, 2009, and 2010 for each firm, the 
absolute energy consumption or intensity data for each firm is not available. Based on 
the available data, this section first discusses decomposition of reported firm energy 
savings into ones related to energy conservation and efficiency investments, ones 
related to expansion and embodied technological change, and ones related to change 
in product composition. Given an appropriate decomposition and control for energy 
intensity change due to expansion and product composition change, the estimation of 
determinants for energy efficiency investments is then discussed, incorporating both 
firm and contextual factors, and both time-variant and time-invariant factors. 
 
4.3.1 Decomposition of energy saving in firms 
The energy savings in year 2009 and 2010 for each firm are readily available 
as the differences in cumulative energy savings between 2009 and 2008, and between 
2010 and 2009. Because most firms chose to calculate their energy savings according 
to energy consumption per unit output for the whole firm, the calculated energy 
savings are determined by a combination of three processes. The first is energy 
efficiency investments for the existing capital or capital turnovers that maintain the 
same production capacity, which reduce energy consumption per unit product, and 
make real energy conservations. The second is expansions and inclusion of new 
production capacities that produces the main products with higher energy efficiency 




production of less energy-intensive products. The third, as a particular case of 
expansions, is the development of new products.  
For simplicity, assume that without prices change, a firm has one process A in 
year t-1, i.e. Et-1= EA, Yt-1= YA; in the next year t, the firm simultaneously invests in 
energy efficiency for process A, adds an additional process B for the same product, 
and produces a new product in process C, i.e. Et= EA` + EB + EC= EA` + EB + Et
new, Yt= 
YA + YB + YC = YA + YB + Yt
new. Given the calculation for annual energy saving in 
equation 4-1a,  
,  
re-arranging the right hand side, dividing both sides by Yt-1, and denoting E/Y as EI 
gives 
 
 , (4-2)  
where on the right hand side of the second equal sign, the first term represents the 
decrease in energy intensity in the old process, the second term represents embodied 
energy intensity improvement in the new capital relative to the old one, and the third 
term represents energy intensity decrease in the new products. The decomposition is 
valid because the method to calculate annual energy saving, approved by the NDRC, 
uses the energy intensity level for an entire firm in the previous year as the basis.  
Such decomposition is not a perfect separation and representation of different 
sources of energy consumption change in firms. For example, while higher capacity 
utilization usually associates with lower energy loss and higher energy efficiency, its 















equation 4-2, depending on whether the utilization rate decreases or increases. Also, 
change in products composition, if not involving new products, is captured by the 
first or second term. The latter example may be less of a concern, because the 
direction of energy-intensity effect of product composition change is likely similar to 
that of new product development, given that is the effect of new product development 
is measurable. To at least partially take into account the effect of capacity utilization, 
the estimation differentiates a decrease in output from an increase, i.e. 
 
,  (4-3)  
where Dj,t is a dummy variable with value one if firm j has an expansion in year t, i.e. 
its output, after excluding new product output, is greater than the output in the 
previous year; α, β, γ, and θ are respectively energy-intensity deceases in the original 
process, in the expanded process, in the process of new products, and in the original 
process when the capacity utilization rate is lower. A descriptive statistics for the used 
variables is in table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Summary statistics for energy saving decomposition. 
Variable Unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
intensity decrease 
(∆Et /Yt-1) 
kg coal equivalent 
/thousand CNY 
962 21.64 94.49 -141.3 2083
expansion rate 
(∆Yt /Yt-1) 
- 962 0.2698 5.998 -1 109.64




- 962 0.1156 1.539 0 46.62
expansion dummy 
(Dt) 
- 962 0.3690 0.4828 0 1
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4.3.2 Decisions on energy-efficiency investment  
Assume that the intensity decrease in the old capacities, i.e. the first term on 
the right hand side of equation 4-2, is driven by energy efficiency investments. Such 
investments are determined by the available technologies K, financial capabilities F, a 
payback cut-off T, and some random disturbance ε, all specific to a firm j, i.e.  
,  (4-4) 
where for simplicity one year lag between the decision and investment outcome is 
assumed. Here a payback cutoff, rather than a hurdle rate or implicit discount rate, is 
used to be consistent with the response from case study interviews, but the selection 
between the two does not influence the general reasoning that follows. 
Available technologies and their specific payback to a firm are determined by 
the firm’s detailed production process, capital vintage structure, fuel mix, and energy 
prices. While the first three are not observable for individual firms, they can be 
generally captured by the firm-specific fixed effect and industry-specific fixed effect 
terms. Because only electricity price is available, coal and petroleum prices are not 
controlled for. This may not be much of a problem, because these prices vary much 
less across regions compared to the electricity price, and usually depend only on 
transportation cost. The variation of technology availability caused by the awareness 
of energy-saving technologies in general and specifically for a firm’s own industrial 
sector is assumed to be trivial, because all the firms had been involved in the Top-
1000 program, and were subjected energy audits; key staff in each firm attended 
training workshops, made energy-conservation plans, and worked closely with the 








Financial capability depends internally on a firm’s current asset relative to 
current liability, often referred to as current ratio, and its profit rate. Generally, high 
current ratio and high profit rate make a firm more favored by a creditor, and more 
likely to get loans. Externally, government provides subsidies and rewards to support 
technology innovation and diffusion, which may help firms in investments. This is 
measured by fiscal expenditure on science and technology, environmental protection 
and energy saving per industrial output relative to the total industrial output for a 
province. 
The main focus here is the payback cutoff explicitly or implicitly used by 
firms, which is assumed to be influenced by both firm characteristics and contextual 
factors.  
Firm characteristics include time-variant ones such as export rate, the number 
of employees, and profit rate, and ones that treated time-invariant due to their 
variance or availability, such as ownership, age, reform and re-registration, and 
expenditures in R&D, in employee education, and in advertisement. While profit rate 
is discussed above as a factor influencing financing capability, it may also affect a 
firm implicit discount rate. As suggested by the case study research in chapter 3, 
firms with lower profit may have stronger motivation to use energy-saving 
investments to lower production cost. Whether a reform and re-registration happened 
in a firm during its participation in the Top-1000 program is a dummy variable, 
acquired by comparing the firm’s ownership type in 2006 and 2010, and checking 




variables should vary annually, but can only get for the year 2007, and are assumed 
relatively the same in the following years.  
Provincial targets – in terms of absolute energy intensity in 2010 and 
percentage decline – may affect firms’ technology adoption, because the local 
governments were likely to make additional pressure for the firms to help with the 
regional targets over time. Similarly, firms in provinces with higher per capita GDP 
and electricity scarcity are assumed to adopt longer payback cutoff, or lower discount 
rate. While the general awareness of technology is assumed irrelevant above, 
learning-by-using and knowledge spillovers – measured by the number of Top-1000 
firms in a province – may reduce a firm’s uncertainty about a technology, and 
therefore lower discount rate and increase energy saving. 
Industrial competition and homogeneity – the average profit rate, share of 
loss-making firms, and distributions of profit rate and output – may also make firms 
use a longer payback cutoff to lower operational costs and improve competitiveness.  
The estimation first introduces time-variant factors into equation 4-3 for 
flexible estimation, leading to 
, (4-5) 
where the second term aggregates the control for output growth, new product 
development, and capacity utilization; j indicates a firm, including its current ratio 
CR, profit rate PR, number of employees NE, and export rate ER; s indicates an 
industrial sector and its contextual factors, including average profit rate AP, share of 
loss-making firms SL, relative standard deviation of profit rate DP, and relative 
standard deviation of output DO; r indicates a region and its contextual factors, 
∆ ,
, 1
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including electricity price EP, electricity scarcity ES, relevant fiscal expenditure rate 
EX, and GDP per capita. One year lag is used for all the variables except government 
expenditure, for which the same year value is used because subsidies and rewards 
were usually given only after the investments had been made, but their availability 
should have been confirmed by the firms before the investments were made.  
Table 4.2 Summary statistics for variables of energy efficiency investments. 
Variable Unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Firm level    
profit rate % 962 3.06 17.93 -198.9 203.7
current ratio - 962 1.17 2.45 0.0190 59.18
employee thousand 962 7.22 14.56 0.07 116.3
export rate % 962 3.99 10.97 0 100
age in 2011 - 481 26.7 19.96 4 111
ownership - 481 1.85 1.24 1 5
reform - 481 0.11 0.31 0 1
education/output % 481 0.086 0.242 0 2.51
R&D/output % 481 0.770 3.078 0 41.86
advertisement/output % 481 0.033 0.232 0 4.60
Industry level    
profit rate % 16 6.70 3.85 1.71 16.34
% of loss-making firms % 16 18.18 6.01 11.34 32.99
relative standard deviation 
of profit rate 
- 16 1.24 0.416 0.873 2.13
relative standard deviation 
of output 
- 16 6.08 6.06 0.855 21.54
Province level    
electricity price CNY/mWh 52 526.1 106.4 309.6 750.3
electricity scarcity - 52 0.747 1.00 0.175 5.567
per capita GDP kCNY 52 25.12 12.49 9.90 68.07
relative fiscal expenditure % 52 1.00 0.662 0.195 3.125
energy efficiency target* kCNY/tce 26 8.76 3.69 0 14.99
percentage target* % 26 18.42 4.41 0 22
involved firms - 26 26.38 20.71 1 94
Note: For Xinjiang province both of the targets and its energy-saving performance were not 
announced. In estimation, the two targets for Xinjiang are treated as zeros or the minimum 
level in other provinces.  
Two ways for estimation and specification of the disturbance terms are 
considered. One uses αj to capture the firm-specific fixed effects. The results are 
expected to reflect firms’ own decision making change in very short terms, i.e. 




observations and fixed effect terms consume a large portion of degrees of freedom, a 
mixed model is considered as an alternative to include αj, ur, and vs first assumed as 
independent and identically distributed random variables across firms, provinces, and 
industries, and then to explore the potential clustered data structure at the individual, 
provincial and industrial levels in the regression analysis. After appropriate 
specification is reached, the time-invariant factors are then included. 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Intensity change in old capacity, new capacity, and new products 
The results for estimation of equation 4-3 are shown in table 4.3. As discussed 
in 4.3.1, the three processes associated with energy intensity change all have 
significant effects on firm energy intensity change and are consistently and highly 
significantly measured in all specifications. There is no measurable effect of lower 
capacity utilization on energy intensity change, whether it is specified as a continuous 
rate or a dummy variable. Firm specific fixed effect and year specific fixed effect 
terms have minor, if any, influences on the estimation. This indicates the usefulness 
of energy intensity decomposition presented in 4-2 and 4-3, and not much 
unexplained variance clustered at the firm level.  
The annual energy-intensity decrease in the old capacity, driven by energy-
efficiency investments and capital turnovers, is about 16 kg coal equivalent per 
thousand CNY, or 16 kgce/kCNY, during 2008-2010. Whether and how capacity 




impressive – considering that a ton of raw coal in China is about 700-800 CNY in 
price and equals about 0.7 ton of coal equivalent, energy-efficiency improvement led 
to annual reduction in operational cost of at least 15 CNY every 1000 CNY output, or 
1.5% increase in gross profit rate.  
Table 4.3 Intensity decreases in old capacity, new capacity, and new products. 
Intensity decrease (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 







































due to utilization 
decrease, dummy (θ) 
- - - -2.164 
(4.480) 
-
firm fixed effects no yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects no no yes no no
N 962 962 962 962 962
adjusted R2 0.6497 0.6692 0.6685 0.6694 0.6699
Notes: In parentheses are standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
The estimates for energy-intensity decrease in the new capacity are about the 
same as that in the old one, but with smaller standard errors. The result represents the 
energy-efficiency improvement embodied in the new capitals, due to technological 
change. Because the overall technological change is not likely influenced by the short 
term regulation in energy saving, its effect is more consistent throughout the firms. In 
comparison, because energy-intensity decrease in old capacity is a mix of 
technological change introduced by capital turnovers and adoption of energy-
efficiency technologies, it varies more across firms.  
Quite unexpectedly, energy intensity increases with the production of new 
products, reflected by the significant and negative sign. To see this closely, table 4.4 




separated. The energy intensity decreases in both old capacity and new capacity are 
much smaller in firms with new products. The estimates for annual energy intensity 
decrease in old capacity in firm without new products are similar to previous 
estimates, but the estimates for decrease in new capacity and capitals are twice as 
previously estimated. In firms with new products, the estimates for new capital are 
similar to previous estimation, and that for old capacity are much smaller and less 
significant. In addition, the variance of energy intensity decrease in the old capacity is 
much larger in firms with new products, when firm specific features are not 
controlled for.  
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firm fixed effects no yes yes no yes yes
N 743 743 743 219 219 219
adjusted R2 0.8207 0.8438 0.8465 0.8242 0.9806 0.9804
Notes: In parentheses are standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 4.5 further displays a dichotomy of firms’ profiles with and without 
new product development. Although the dependent variable, annual energy intensity 
decrease relative to previous output, has very close values in the two kinds of firms, 
the firms with new product development are on average almost three times larger in 
output and six times larger in output growth even if new products and lower capacity 




annually and in total according to the NDRC’s calculation, compared to that in firms 
without new products. In addition, the percentage of firms with new products varies 
greatly across industries, from only one firm in electric power industry to half of the 
firms in iron and steel industry.  
Table 4.5 Statistics for firms with and without new products. 












no new product 743 21.79 0.083 0.219 5.88 27.4 356 147.9
with new product 219 21.14 0.902 1.21 14.9 66.4 125 316.4
 
The seemingly different results in table 4.4 and table 4.5 reflect different ways 
to fulfill energy saving in the two kinds of firms and the calculation method. 
Although the energy intensity decrease in new capitals is much larger than that in old 
capacity, its contribution to the calculated energy saving is scaled by the growth rate 
of output, as indicated by equation 4-2 and 4-3. The 743 observations without new 
products have an average annual output growth of 21.9%, which scales the intensity 
decrease in new capitals down to only half of the decrease in old capacity, even if the 
negative energy-efficiency effect of lower capacity utilization in old capacity is not 
considered. On the other hand, the 219 observations with new products have an 
average annual output growth of 121%, which scales the intensity decrease in new 
capitals up to four times larger than the decrease in old capacity, using the results 
based on fixed effect estimations. Much larger average output of firms with new 
products further makes the absolute amount of energy conservation in old capacity 
comparable to that in firms without new products, and makes the calculated energy 





Figure 4.2 The number of firms with and without new products by industries. 
The major energy saving method for firms without new product development 
is through energy-efficiency investments, and the method for firms with new products 
is through great expansion and moderate efficiency improvement in new capitals. 
There are two possible reasons for less energy-efficiency improvement in firms with 
new products. One is that energy saving and associated cost reduction and 
development of new products and associated market differentiation are alternative 
approaches for firms’ motivation to improve competitiveness. The other is that the 
two are competing investment decisions that require substantial financial and 
technological capabilities. Additionally, there may also be a measurement issue that 
contributes the difference. The output growth is measured in monetary terms and may 
partially reflect better market condition for those firms with higher growth rate. If this 
is the case, the firms with new products face less competition pressure, and therefore 





4.4.2 Determinants for energy-efficiency investments 
The results above suggest that the firms with and without new products should 
be differentiated in the following estimation for factors influencing energy savings. 
The results of pooled OLS and fixed effects estimation, and that of mixed effects 
estimation are in table 4.6 and table 4.7, respectively. The fixed effect estimation is 
supposed to capture the short-term effect by focusing on variance within firms, while 
the pooled OLS estimation is supposed to capture the longer term effect by 
comparing between firms. The mixed effect estimation improves both estimations by 
taking care of the clustered data at different levels.  
Particularly for firms without new products, the first mixed effect estimation 
shows that most of unexplained variability is at the industrial level and to a lesser 
extent at the provincial level, but not at the individual firm level. This echoes the 
close values of adjusted R2 for the pooled and fixed effects estimations in table 4.6, 
and an F-test, which cannot reject the null hypothesis that all fixed effect terms are 
zeros. Including random coefficients for the new capacity term at the industry and 
provincial level further improves the mixed effect estimation. This reflects the fact 
that efficiency improvement in new capitals differ among industries and among 
provinces. On the other hand, for the firms with new products, the data is clustered at 
the firm level, for which fixed effects estimation is appropriate and does improve the 
estimation results. The results are therefore separately interpreted for firms without 
and with new products, with the former mainly based on the second specification of 





Table 4.6 Factors for energy efficiency investments with pooled and fixed effect 
estimation. 
Intensity decrease all no new products with new products 
pooled pooled FE pooled FE 











































































































































in new product  -7.618*** 
(1.408)
















firm fixed effects no no yes no yes
N 960 742 742 218 218
adjusted R2 0.6606 0.8420 0.8467 0.8771 0.9812
Notes: In parentheses are standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
For firms without new products, higher profit and more export are associated 
with less energy saving in all estimations, with the only exception of fixed effects 
estimation, which only captures the difference within firms between 2008 and 2009. 




presented in the previous chapter, and the finding of Decanio and Watkins (1998) that 
firms with less expected future earnings growth are more likely to join the Green 
Lights program. It confirms that firms with less profit are more likely to adopt 
energy-efficiency investments with longer payback, so as to lower cost and improve 
competitiveness. The correlation between higher exports and lower energy saving 
does not follow the usual expectation of firms’ environmental practice. For example, 
Nakamura et al. (2001) find that Japanese firms with more export are more likely to 
obtain ISO 14001 certification. The explanation may also link to the previous 
reasoning – more export is likely associated with more differentiated products and 
markets, tax rebates, and less pressure of competition, and therefore less motivation 
to lower the energy cost. The number of employee has no effect on energy saving, 
which is consistent Anderson and Newell (2004)’s finding of selective adoption from 
energy audits in small and medium-size firms, and differs from many other studies. 
This may result from explicit control for output and output growth in this estimation. 
Current ratio also has no measurable effect, indicating that firms’ energy-efficiency 
investments are not significantly affected by liquidity constraints in current policy 
setting with financing support from the government and ESPC. Similarly, Japanese 
firms are also not subject to liquidity constraints (Sugino and Arimura 2011). 
At the industry level, there is some evidence that lower average industry profit 
rate, like firms’ own profit, also contributes to more energy saving. On the other 
hand, industries with more loss-making firms seem less likely to reduce energy 
consumption, which may suggest absolute loss, compared to lower profit, is a 




Table 4.7 Factors for energy efficiency investments with mixed-effect estimation. 
Intensity decrease all no new products with new products 










































































































































in new product  -7.412*** 
(1.387)










































new capacity× αj - - - - 4.292 
(1.594)
new capacity× ur - - 38.63 
(8.91)
- -
new capacity× vs - - 8.229 
(12.44)
- -
N 960 742 742 218 218
Log-likelihood -5197 -3646 -3616 -1115 -924
Notes: For random effects, standard deviations are estimated. In parentheses are standard 




firms to improve competitiveness. The coefficients for the two factors measuring 
industry homogeneity are not significant.   
Provincial context has stronger influence. As expected, higher electricity price 
and more fiscal expenditure on science and technology, environmental protection and 
energy saving both encourage more energy efficiency investments, suggesting that 
market and technology policies can be effective. GDP per capita is negatively 
correlated with energy saving, unlike the expectation. This result is robust in all 
estimations and may reflect the fact in more developed provinces with higher GDP 
per capita, firms had already used more advanced technologies and had less potential 
in energy conservation and efficiency improvement. In comparison, in firms with new 
products, where major energy saving is through expansion and embodied technology 
change in new capitals, energy intensity decrease is not associated with GDP per 
capita.  
The coefficient for capacity utilization is negative in all specifications except 
the second mixed effects estimation. However, as specified in equation 4-3, decrease 
in capacity utilization is measured as negative output growth, suggesting that lower 
capacity utilization actually decreases energy intensity. This may reflect that the 
measurement mainly captures the process of outdated capacity closure, which 
suspended capacities that were most energy-intensive. 
The energy intensity decrease in firms with new products is clearly different. 
The decrease is negatively associated with profit and the percentage of loss-making 
firms, like in the estimation for firms without new products. Electricity scarcity 




coefficients, these firms seem to be more sensitive to their profit rates when making 
energy saving investments, indicating they are more flexible in determining whether 
or not to invest in energy saving. There is no evidence of influences from other 
factors. The explanatory variables, however, do help correct the negative correlation 
between new products development and energy intensity decrease. This means that 
the negative impact of new product development on energy efficiency investment has 
been controlled for in the current specifications, and new product production is not 
intentionally directed to either energy saving or energy consuming.  
With the mixed effects specifications, the time-invariant factors – firms’ age, 
ownership, reform, and expenditures in R&D, in education, and in advertisements, 
and provincial regulations and knowledge spillovers – are also included. None of 
these factors show statistically significant effect on energy saving. However, their 
interaction term between ownership and the new capital for firms without new 
products, that between ownership and the new capital and between R&D and the new 
capital for firms with new products have significant coefficient. This indicates some 
effect of firm heterogeneity only on the choice of new capitals. 
 
4.5 Discussion and implications 
The energy efficiency gap and investment barriers have been explained as 
market failures and behavioral barriers (Gillingham et al. 2009; Jaffe et al. 2004). 
Market related barriers include incomplete information and uncompensated positive 
externalities in information diffusion, externalities in innovation and adoption, 




Behavioral barriers include the uncertainty and irreversibility in efficiency 
investment, biased investment estimation, and heterogeneity of energy users.  
While increasing focus is now given to the behavioral barriers in energy 
efficiency investments, this research indicates no measurable evidence of these 
factors in correlation with energy intensity decrease in old production capacities of 
Chinese energy-intensive firms, even for commonly observed influences such as 
ownership and firm size. Limited association between firm feature and energy 
efficiency is found only in the selection of new capitals. On the one hand, this result 
is supported by the method to focus on energy intensity change, rather than absolute 
demand change, and to control for change in capital structure and product 
composition. On the other hand, this result relates to the research setting of the Top-
1000 program, which combines information dissemination, voluntary agreement, 
monitoring, and financial support. These measures help remove market failures and 
behavioral barriers – such as lack of information and uncertainty – in adopting energy 
efficiency technologies. Because new capital investments are not subject to these 
policy measures, firms’ heterogeneity in new capital investments still exists. 
The factors that help explain most of firms’ variance in energy intensity 
decrease are all economic ones. Particularly, the results support the observation of the 
case study research in the previous chapter and another research, showing that higher 
competitive pressure pushes firms to make more ambitious energy efficiency 
investments to reduce operational costs. Lower firm and industry-wide profits and 
lower export rate all associate with more energy intensity decrease. Corresponding 




energy intensity decrease. The significance of firms’ rational behaviors in energy 
saving is again greatly due to the policy assistance, especially ESPC which helps 
firms acquire financing support for their investments more easily. However, there is 
likely a fine line between competitive pressure and absolute loss, which negatively 
affects the investments, probably because industries with more loss-making firms are 
less favored in the capital market and by the energy services companies.  
Government expenditures do help firms in reducing energy intensity, unlike 
the previous chapter that suggests serious free-riders. The results reflect on the one 
hand the difference of two types of research design and sample selection, and on the 
other hand the limited effectiveness of financial policies in energy saving. Therefore, 
further research is needed to examine to what extent and under what conditions the 
financial policies are effective, and how efficient they are. 
According the current calculation method for firm energy saving, which refers 
to the energy consumption per output at the firm level in the previous year as the 
basis, firms with greater expansion – usually indicated by the development of new 
products – fulfilled much more energy saving. However, these firms adopt new 
capitals with less efficiency improvement and conserve energy in their existing 
production capacity at a slower pace, compared to firms with less or no expansion, 
and take advantage of their higher growth rate and greater output in energy saving 
calculation. The fact suggests the need for more detailed energy audit and monitor, 
and energy saving targets designed in absolute terms, if energy conservation and 




Chapter 5 Spatially based regulation and industry location 
The previous two chapters focus on firms’ reduction in energy consumption 
under the current policy. Alternatively, firms may choose to relocate and avoid higher 
regulation. Based on a dataset of 20 two-digit manufacturing industries across 29 
provinces during 2005-2010, the impact of the provincial energy-saving regulations 
on manufacturing location in general, and the differential impact across industrial 
sectors are examined. 
This research departs from the existing literature in three important aspects. 
First, unlike the previous literature with dichotomy of policy stringency or 
inappropriate proxies for regulation, the energy-saving regulation stringency in China 
is predetermined by the policy targets, varies continuously across provinces, and 
interacts with industries in a complicated way according to an industry’s energy 
intensity, as measured by energy consumption per unit of value added. Second, 
potential unobserved heterogeneity raised by spatially dependent data generating 
processes, such as the adaption of provincial governance according to neighboring 
provinces and spillovers of factors of production, may not be fully addressed by using 
fixed effects terms. This research explicitly tests for spatial autocorrelation in the data 
set. Third, previous research was usually based on a single policy measure. In 
contrast, this paper compares the spatial effect of electricity price with that of 
regulation on energy saving. It also compares different regulatory effects between 
industrial sectors nation-wide, complementing the main drivers of inter-provincial 




understanding of the policy impacts of various manifestations of environmental 
regulation stringency on industrial location. 
In addition to its contribution to the literature, the research provides a basis on 
which to evaluate energy-saving policies in China and to inform efforts at 
strengthening long-term energy saving and regional sustainability. The spatially based 
regulations are basically the same in 2011-2015 as in 2006-2010 of the research 
period, and may be extended to 2020 for the committed national target of CO2 
emission reduction. Studies show that Chinese industrial relocation in the early 
1990s, especially the movement of energy-intensive industries into the east coast 
region where energy intensity is relatively low, helped save more energy, thanks to 
the region’s endowment, preferential policies, and spatial interactions (Zhao and Yin 
2011; Yu 2012). Policy-induced relocation of energy-intensive industries outside the 
region may decrease energy saving through other means. The relocation may also 
increase the consumption of other resources in high demand by the energy-intensive 
industries, like water, in other regions, and raise a threat to regional sustainability.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The first section briefly 
introduces the previous literature regarding the locational effect of environmental 
regulations. Section 2 and section 3 explain the use of data and estimation approach, 
respectively. The results for baseline estimation, spatial autocorrelation and spatial 
models, and those for dichotomous policy measures and nation-wide policy effects 
are reported in section 4 and section 5, respectively. The paper closes in section 6 





5.1 Previous research 
Whether industrial activities are sensitive to inter-jurisdictional differences in 
environmental regulation has long been a research focus. Domestically, this question 
concerns the economic costs of environmental regulations – the loss of productivity 
and jobs due to higher regulation, and the costs of relocating production and workers 
across regions. Internationally, understanding impacts of tougher regulation on 
industry is essential to the debate over competitiveness, emissions leakage, and trade 
liberalization. Regulation-induced displacement of production and associate pollution 
may be further encouraged under trade liberalization, which leads to a concern that 
firms undercutting environmental standards to maintain competitiveness (Cole et al. 
2006; Kim and Wilson 1997; Konisky 2007). Alternative arguments exist, however, 
notably Porter’s dynamic view of comparative advantage, suggesting that proper 
design of environmental regulations can encourage innovation and technological 
change, and thus enhance competitiveness (Porter and Van der Linde 1995). 
Both lines of argument call for better institutional arrangements to control 
pollution, which requires clear understanding of the types and size of costs induced 
by various environmental regulations currently enforced. 
The most extensively studied regulation is the county nonattainment 
designations under the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) in the US. Its regulatory 
effect has been confirmed to be negative and significant on polluting firms’ location 
in nonattainment counties (Henderson 1996; Becker and Henderson 2000; List et al. 
2003), their growth (Greenstone 2002), employment (Walker 2011), productivity 




regulation caused US based multinational firms to increase their foreign production 
(Hanna 2010). The estimated cost of reallocating workforce is far below the estimated 
benefit, but is much larger than the transition assistance allocated under the regulation 
(Walker 2012). 
The evidence of other regulatory effects is not comparably satisfactory. The 
main reasons, from the perspective of research design, are the use of indirect policy 
measures that cause endogeneity in regression models, and the lack of panel data to 
deal with unobserved heterogeneity. Unlike the county ambient attainment status, 
which is directly observed and predetermined for the research period, indirect proxies 
for environmental regulation are usually used in other research. The most popular 
proxies in studies about the US environmental regulation impacts on industry come in 
the form of adjusted pollution abatement costs and expenditure measures. However, 
these measures have been confirmed to be endogenously determined through 
jurisdictional interactions in adjusting regulations (Levinson and Taylor 2008) or 
reversely by industrial activities (Ederington and Minier 2003), and to have 
insignificant effect on industrial activities if treated exogenously (Levinson 1996; 
Becker 2011). Research about regulatory impacts on industry location in European 
countries often uses environmental indexes that are not directly associated with 
practical regulation levels, often uses single-period cross-sectional data, and shows 







5.2.1 Data source 
The main dataset for this research comes from the China Industry Economy 
Statistical Yearbooks, which report industry-aggregate characters in each province 
annually, such as the number of firms, employment, and payable value-added tax. 
Only the manufacturing sector are considered because they are less dependent on 
geographical proximity to natural resources or consumers, and thus are more 
footloose than the mining and utility sectors. The dataset covers consistently all state-
owned firms, and non-state-owned firms with annual sales of five million CNY or 
more. These firms accounted for more than 95% of manufacturing value added in 
2005. Out of the 30 two-digit manufacturing industries according to the national 
industry classification standard (GB/T 4754-2002), 21 are consistently reported by 
the Yearbooks at the provincial level annually. The other nine industries that are not 
reported and not available for this study accounted for only 9% of manufacturing 
value added in 2005. Because the year 2004 was an industry census year, whose more 
comprehensive survey coverage produced industrial statistics out of the track 
described by the data from the years before and after, only data of years after 2004 
are used.  
The dataset is sufficient for the study, with the 2005 and 2006 as base years, 
and 2007-2010 as years with provincially differentiated regulations. Other provincial 
characteristics, such as Gross Regional Productivity (GRP), fiscal revenue, and 
unemployment rate, come from the China Statistical Yearbooks. Industrial 




China Statistical Yearbooks, China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbooks, and 
China Economic Census Yearbook 2004. Most energy-related data, such as industrial 
energy consumption and provincial electricity production and consumption, come 
from the China Energy Statistical Yearbooks.  
 
5.2.2 Data selection 
Both employment and value added or output can indicate industrial size 
industrial location change. Employment is used here because value added by industry 
has not been reported since 2007, and output may reflect changes in supply or 
demand markets that are not related to industry location. 
Regulatory stringency of energy-saving policies is measured by the inverse of 
the 2010 energy-intensity target for each province, announced by the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and maintained on its website. In 
this way, the policy measure is expressed as an energy-efficiency target – the value 
added per energy consumption required to be met. A higher value represents more 
stringent regulation, which includes extensive energy-saving requirements, high 
administrative pressure, strict capacity control and elimination, and even direct 
relocation request, as indicated by the case study research in chapter 3. 
Provincial targets interact with industrial performance on energy intensity, 
measured accordingly as industrial energy consumption per value added so that 
higher energy intensity and higher targets lead to tougher industry-by-province 
regulation. Only 2005 data are used to construct industrial energy intensity for two 




consumption in 2005, and provincial enforcement, beginning around 2006-2007, 
could only use 2005 industrial energy consumption as the latest reference. Later 
enforcement may still follow the initially differentiated approaches to different 
industries, because the industry-specific and firm-specific requirements may have 
already been designed. Second, value added data are no longer reported at the two-
digit or lower industry levels after 2007, making calculation of energy intensity 
unavailable. Considering that the time span of analysis is short, and the differences 
among industries’ energy intensities are large (figure 2.2), it is assumed that the 
relative regulation levels across industries were unchanged. 
The regulations are not randomly assigned, and considering these factors that 
may correlate with provincial energy-saving targets are particularly important for 
estimating the locational effect of regulation. As a counterpart of current local 
regulations on energy saving, the data of provincial electricity prices and industrial 
performance on electricity consumption are collected (figure 5.1a), implying the 
locational effect of a potential market policy. Provincial electricity prices in 2007-
2010 are the sum of the provincial weighted average sales prices and provincial 
surcharges, reported in the annual Supervising Reports of Electricity Pricing by the 
State Electricity Regulatory Commission. The 2006 price is calculated by subtracting 
from the 2007 prices the price increases in 2007, reported from the same source. The 
2005 price is calculated by subtracting from the 2006 prices half of the provincial 
price adjustments announced by the NDRC. The price adjustments are weighted by 
half as the price differences between 2005 and 2006 under two observations: First, the 




of the prices before and after the adjustment, assuming the same amount of electricity 
consumption in the first and second halves in 2006. Second, no price adjustment has 
been found on the NDRC’s 2005 announcement list, which suggests that the price in 
2005 for a province might be the same as that in the first half of 2006.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Spatial correlation of electricity price and energy endowment in 2010.  
Energy endowment is the difference between electricity production and consumption. 
(Data source: State Electricity Regulatory Commission’s Annual Supervising Reports 






Industrial electricity consumption is measured differently from their energy-
intensity performance, namely as the ratio between annual electricity consumption 
and annual production cost. In this way, the interaction between provincial prices and 
industrial performance is a measure of electricity cost in industrial production cost for 
each industry in each province, and represents the industry’s sensitivity to electricity 
pricing. Annual industrial electricity consumption comes from the China Energy 
Statistical Yearbooks, and the main business costs, reported by the China Industry 
Economy Statistical Yearbooks, are used as proxies for the annual industry 
production costs. 
Similarly, provinces with lax targets and low electricity prices usually have 
more abundant energy endowments, which may also attract energy-intensive 
industries. This energy endowment is measured as electricity surplus, i.e. production 
minus consumption, for each province in general (figure 5.1b). The interaction term 
between provincial surplus and industrial energy intensity is used to measure 
industry-specific attractions in each province. Likewise, the development level of a 
province may correlate with both its energy-saving target and its economic structure, 
and is measured in per capita GRP. 
Other individual-level and provincial-level covariates are also controlled, to at 
least increase estimation precision. Individual-level covariates include scale 
economies, measured as average employment per firm, and local protectionism, 
measured as the share of industry-specific payable value-added tax in provincial 
fiscal income. The former is a common determinant for industrial agglomeration, and 




Other factors that are discussed in the industrial agglomeration literature, such 
as knowledge spillovers, are not considered at the individual level but at the 
provincial level, because including them at the individual level greatly reduces the 
number of observations, changes the sample structure systematically, and does not 
improve the estimation, as preliminary analysis have shown. These factors include 
market size, measured here by provincial GRP and population, economic prosperity, 
measured by GRP growth and unemployment rate, labor supply, measured by the 
number of vocational school graduates, labor cost, measured by manufacturing wage, 
knowledge spillovers, measured by the number of patents, transportation 
infrastructure, measured by total volume of freight traffic, and manufacturing 
investment.  
 
5.2.3 Data description 
Some adjustments are made for the sample before estimation. The tobacco 
industry is excluded because it is an extremely small sector compared to others, with 
no more than four firms in most provinces. Also, industries in Xinjiang province are 
excluded because the provincial policy target is not available, and industries in Tibet 
are excluded because the geographic feature prevents most of the industries from 
locating there. Out of the remaining 20 industries in 29 provinces, 13 provincial 
industrial units are not observed in all the six years of 2005-2010. Although observed 
in some years, they are excluded to create a balanced panel dataset, mainly for the 
spatial analysis. Analyses show this final adjustment does not affect the estimation 




observed in six years. Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables in the 
final sample.  
Table 5.1 Summary statistics. 
Variable Unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
industry by province    
employment 1,000 people 3402 105.5 205.7 0.2 3245
average firm size 1,000 people 3402 0.284 0.289 0.026 6.13
tax contribution % 3402 1.78 2.43 0.001 24.55
provincial    
efficiency target CNY/kgce 29 9.18 3.50 3.02 15.78
electricity price CNY/kWh 174 0.457 0.095 0.259 0.711
energy surplus billion kWh 174 -0.431 28.38 -85.2 96.33
per capita GRP 1,000 CNY 174 19.36 12.17 4.47 57.86
provincial GRP  trillion CNY 174 0.810 0.665 0.4844 3.30
population million people 174 44.11 26.28 5.39 101.30
GRP growth % 174 13.12 2.22 5.40 23.80
unemployment rate % 174 3.81 0.64 1.3 6.5
vocational school 
graduates 
1,000 people 174 139.9 100.9 5.804 466.9
manufacturing wage 1,000 CNY 174 17.91 5.02 11.03 39.00
patent granted 1,000 items 174 9.18 14.81 0.07 87.29
freight traffic billion ton 174 0.736 0.494 0.0621 2.841
manufacturing investment trillion CNY 174 0.129 0.143 0.0045 0.790
industrial    
industrial energy intensity kgce/CNY 20 0.23 0.23 0.026 0.76
electricity consumed/cost Wh/CNY 120 61.74 49.87 13.56 212.63
% of export shipments % 120 17.39 16.49 1.659 68.14
% of loss-making firms % 120 16.73 3.86 8.04 27.14
% private employment % 120 29.69 9.67 8.32 50.59
% state employment % 120 22.02 14.79 1.97 58.95
foreign investment, lag billion CNY 120 52.32 53.86 4.85 280.4
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Macao investment, lag 
billion CNY 120 26.49 24.53 4.43 151.0
Notes: All the monetary variables are initially collected at current price, and deflated at 2005 
price for description and estimation. The price deflator for each year is calculated as the ratio 
between GDP growth at current price and that at constant price, i.e. pt = (GDPt,current / GDP2005, 






5.3 Empirical approach 
5.3.1 Baseline specification 
Employment is assumed to be negatively affected by regulatory stringency, 
which varies across provinces, across industries within each province, and through 
time. For the ease of estimation, it is first assumed that the incremental accumulation 
of policy impacts after initial enforcement is linear through time. This strong 
assumption is relaxed later. The effect of regulations – the enforcement of energy-
efficiency targets – and their counterparts of electricity pricing, both generally on a 
province and specifically on an industry within the province, is then expressed as 
, (5-1) 
where Tp is province p’s energy-efficiency target, Ppt is its electricity price in year t, 
EIi is industry i’s energy intensity in 2005, Elit is its electricity consumption per 
business cost in year t, εipt is an individually and identically distributed disturbance 
term, and τ is zero in base years 2005 and 2006, one in year 2007, two in year 2008, 
and so forth. The policy enforcement is assumed to be effective from 2007 onward, 
because provincial targets were announced at the end of 2006, and the NDRC did not 
evaluate and audit provincial fulfillment of their targets until 2008 for the year 2007.  
The natural log of employment is used to remove the highly skewed 
distribution.  Similarly, the natural log for electricity price is used to readily allow for 
the interpretation of its regression coefficient as price elasticity. The same 
transformation is not applied to policy targets because the differences between 
provincial targets are much larger, and an elasticity interpretation is not convenient. 





Like employment, the statistical distributions of other individual-level 
observations – employment, tax contribution, and average firm size – are 
considerably skewed with thick tails. They are transformed by taking the natural 
logarithm before entering into the estimation. 
All these individual-level covariates and provincial-level factors enter into the 
estimation with one-year lag, to avoid potential simultaneity and to strengthen the 
causal inference on energy-saving regulations. As an exception, specifications with 
contemporary and lagged electricity data are both considered, because electricity 
price before 2005 is not available, which leads to one year less observations with 
lagged electricity data. 
The preexisting industrial composition in each province is controlled by 
industry-by-province fixed effects terms. The national-level energy-saving policies 
and other domestic and foreign influences that have different impacts across 
industries but not provinces are controlled by industry-by-year fixed effects terms. 
The estimation is in the form of 
   , (5-2) 
where yipt is the employment in industry i, province p, and year t, Regipt is the effect 
of energy-efficiency target and electricity pricing specified before, Xipt-1 is the lagged 
individual-level covariates, Xpt-1 is the lagged provincial-level covariates, µip is the 
industry-by-province fixed effects, θit is the industry-by-year fixed effects, and εipt is 
an individually and identically distributed disturbance term.  
 




5.3.2 Spatial autocorrelation 
The data sample may be spatially correlated and lead to inconsistent estimates, 
because of spatially-dependent data generation process, such as neighboring 
provincial governments competing with each other to attract investors, or unobserved 
spatial heterogeneity, such as spillovers of factors of production. Particularly relevant 
here is provincial governments monitoring the behavior of other provinces so as to 
balance their environmental regulation and economic growth.  
A simple way to detect the spatial correlation in data is to map them 
geographically and observe the pattern directly. In this way, figure 2.1 shows the 
spatial autocorrelation of provincial energy-intensity targets. For more complicated 
data structure and tests of statistical significance, some measures are used, among 
which Moran’s I is the most common one. Moran’s I is a statistic structured as the 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between one variable and its spatial 
lag, produced by multiplying with the variable a spatial weight matrix W:  
  ,  (5-3) 
where is zi the observation of z in region i,  is the average of z across regions, and Wij 
is the element in the spatial weight matrix W, denoting some spatial relationship 
from region j to region i. The value ranges from -1 – perfect dispersion – to +1 – 
perfect correlation. Spatial autocorrelation is indicated by a significant deviation from 
zero, the random dispersion.  
A spatial weight matrix is usually constructed in a geometric way, for 
example based on contiguity of spatial units, or in a more theoretical formulation, for 
example based on a distance decline function. In research about China, Coughlin and 
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Segev (2000) and Yu and Wei (2003) both use contiguity-based weight matrices. 
Because Hainan province is an island with no neighbors, the former specify Hainan 
and Guangdong province as contiguous, and the latter combine the two as a single 
province, considering their geographic proximity and historical unity. Madariaga and 
Poncet (2007) construct the spatial weight matrix based on the inverse of squared 
distance, and Yu (2012) construct the matrix based on the inverse of distance.  
Both contiguity-based and squared distance-based weight matrices are 
considered here, with Hainan province treated contiguous with Guangdong province. 
The former is expected to capture more small-scale spillovers and externalities among 
cities and counties along the border, and the latter is expected to capture more large-
scale interactions and spillovers between provinces. The weight between province i 
and j is set to one if i and j are contiguous and to zero otherwise in the former, and is 
set to the inverse of their squared distance in the latter. The matrices built are then 
row-standardized so that all the weights between a province and all the others sum to 
one. Kronecker products of the weight matrices and corresponding identity matrices 
are used, to construct block matrices with dimensions of the numbers of one-year 
observations or total observations of the dataset, and one block containing weights for 
an industry in one year across provinces.  
The core specification can be revised to measure the size of spatial 
dependence. One way is to explicitly add spatial lags of the dependent variable to the 
model, as a spatial autoregressive model:  




where W is the weight matrix, and ρ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient 
describing the strength of spatial dependence, with a value between -1 and 1. 
Alternatively, it can be assumed that spatial autocorrelation only exists in the error 
terms as a spatial error model. The previously specified fixed effects and disturbance 
terms are revised as:  
    ,   (5-5) 
where λ is the spatial autocorrelation coefficient, µip is the individual fixed effects, 
and νipt is independently and identically distributed disturbance term over industry, 
province, and time.  
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Baseline estimation 
Table 5.2 reports the value of coefficients and associate standard errors 
obtained from estimating several variations of equation 5-2. The coefficient for the 
provincial target, industrial intensity, and time interaction term (β2) is negative and 
significant under all specifications, indicating a deterrent effect of energy-saving 
regulations on energy-intensive industries. When preexisting provincial industrial 
compositions are controlled by industry-by-province fixed effects, as in columns 2 to 
5, the coefficient is consistently estimated between -0.82 and -0.72%. It is the most 
significant among the three energy-related factors that affect industry location. 
The coefficient for the cross-industry impact of provincial energy-efficiency 





electricity data. The positive value is explained elsewhere (Mulatu et al. 2010) as 
forming a cut-off point with the interaction term, which usually has a negative value, 
so that for industrial pollution there is a neutral level above which industries are 
negatively affected and below which industries are positively affected. However, the 
decreasing magnitude and significance of the cross-industry coefficient when more 
variables are controlled, and especially when the regression is specified with lagged 
electricity data and only 2006 as base year (column 4) suggest that an alternative 
model specification is also relevant.  
Regulatory impact on employment can be more accurately interpreted 
combining the cross-industry and industry-specific terms, based on the estimation of 
column 4. Taking an industry of high energy intensity of 0.7 kg coal equivalent/CNY 
(nonmetallic mineral products or ferrous metals industries), a regulatory difference of 
7 CNY/kgce, i.e. two standard deviations of the energy-efficiency targets, causes an 
annual employment loss of 2.8% under high regulation relative to low regulation 
(exp((-0.0082×0.7+0.0017)×7)-100%, or (-0.82%×0.7+0.17%)×7 roughly, similarly 
afterwards), and 12% in four years. In contrast, an industry with low energy intensity 
of 0.05 kgce/ CNY would experience 0.9% relative gain in annual employment, and 
3.7% in four years under high regulation. If the cut-off point argument stands, the 
ratio between the two coefficients suggests that industries with 2005 energy intensity 
above 0.21 kgce/CNY were negatively affected by high regulation. They include 
nonmetallic mineral products, ferrous metals, petroleum and coal processing, raw 
chemical material and chemical products, nonferrous metals, paper and paper 




Table 5.2 Regulatory effects on log employment, core specifications. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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industry by province no yes yes yes yes 
industry by year no no yes yes yes 
province by year no no no no yes 
N 3402 3402 3402 2835 2835 
adjusted R2 0.7773 0.9885 0.9898 0.9911 0.9922 
Notes: In parentheses are standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 




The evidence of electricity pricing’s deterrent impacts on industrial 
employment is not comparably strong – the interactive coefficient is only negative 
and significant when one year lag is used at 10% level. A cut-off point is 70 Wh/CNY 
of electricity consumption per unit of production cost, above which were only four 
industries in 2010 – nonferrous metals, nonmetallic mineral products, ferrous metals, 
and raw chemical material and chemical products industries. The list included 
additionally paper and paper products, chemical fibers, metal products, and textile 
industries in 2005. With the highest electricity consumption per unit of production 
cost data from nonferrous metals industry of 136 Wh/CNY in 2009 and 213 Wh/ 
CNY in 2005, 1% increase in electricity price would lead to an employment decline 
in that industry of 0.17% in 2010 and 0.37% in 2006. In comparison, a recent study in 
the US at the state level shows the results for industry-wide effect of the same 
magnitude (Deschenes 2010); at county level, almost all industries are confirmed to 
be negatively affected by electricity prices, with the largest elasticity of -1.13, one 
magnitude higher (Kahn and Mansur 2010). 
When lagged electricity data is used, there is strong evidence that 
manufacturing industries were attracted by provinces with more abundant energy 
supply. Provinces with electricity surplus two standard deviations higher (57 billion 
kWh) are associated with 8.6% more manufacturing employment. However, there is 
no evidence that the energy endowment is more attractive to energy-intensive 
industries. The effect of interaction between energy endowment and industries with 
higher electricity-intensity is also estimated with no significant influence on 





5.4.2 Spatial autocorrelation and estimation 
Moran’s I is used as the test statistic for the dependent variables and 
corresponding p-values inferred from random permutations of the real data are listed 
in table 5.3. With either specification of the weight matrix, spatial correlation of 
industrial employment was strong throughout the research period. In contrast, the 
estimated residuals in the previous section specified by column 4 in table 5.2 do not 
have any autocorrelation, with the only exception of negative autocorrelation in 2006 
at 10% significance using the contiguity weight matrix. This may suggest some 
small-scale industry relocation between neighboring provinces in 2006, which is not 
captured in the estimation, because 2006 is assumed as a base year with no spatially 
differentiated regulation. 
Table 5.3 Moran’s I of dependent variables and estimated residuals. 
 Total 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Contiguity-based W        


























Distance-based W        


























Notes: In parentheses are p-values inferred as the rank of the Moran’s I statistic of the real 
data relative to the reference distribution of the statistics, created from 999 random 
permutations of the real data. A high p-value larger than 0.95 suggests negative spatial 








Table 5.4 Regulatory effects on log employment, spatial lag and spatial error models. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
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λ  -0.0389  
σν
2 0.0166 0.0199 0.0209 
N 2835 2835 2835 
Notes: In parentheses are standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Industry by province fixed effects and industry by year fixed 
effects terms are included. 
Following the Moran’s I statistics, the contiguity spatial weight matrix is used. 




(2007) , and the generalization of Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011) for within-estimators 
and spatial autoregressive models. The extensions for the specification of column 4 in 
table 5.2 with spatial lag and spatial autocorrelation are listed in column 1 and 2 of 
table 5.4, respectively. Column 3 shows the original estimation without spatial 
consideration. As suggested by Moran’s I statistics, there is very little, if any, spatial 
dependence identified. The spatial coefficients are insignificant and small. Including 
spatial terms leaves little less variance unexplained, and makes the estimation for the 
three energy-related factors in larger magnitude, but the change is very little 
compared to the baseline estimation. In general, there is no evidence for the strategic 
interaction between provincial governments in energy-saving regulations.  
 
5.5 Qualitative measures of regulation 
An extension from the estimation of equation 5-2 is considered in this section, 
based on dichotomous measures of regulatory stringency. With the dichotomous 
measures of regulations and industries, also considered in this section is nation-wide 
effect of energy-saving regulations with a triple-difference estimation framework. 
 
5.5.1 Estimation sensitivity to qualitative measures of regulation 
The analyses above use the absolute value of provincial energy-efficiency 
targets (value added per energy consumption), and industrial energy intensity (energy 
consumption per value added), to measure the provincial regulatory stringency and 




pertain to the impact of the performance-based energy-saving regulations in China. 
Alternatively, it is useful to consider alternative, dichotomous measures of regulations 
and industries, as high/low regulation, and energy-intensive/less intensive industry. 
By doing so, the magnitude and trend of regulatory effect is more transparent and 
comparable with other research, and the sensitivity of the results to measures of 
regulation and industry can be tested.  
Pooling industries into groups is relatively easy, because there are sharp 
discontinuities in the distribution industrial energy intensity according to the 2005 
data. Four industries have intensity levels above 0.54 kgce/CNY, i.e. above the cut-
off point suggested by the regression with base year 2005 and contemporaneous 
electricity data. Another three have intensity levels below 0.40 but above 0.28 kgce/ 
CNY – i.e. above the cut-off point suggested by the regression with base year 2006 
and lagged electricity data. The other 13 industries include three with intensity levels 
between 0.11 and 0.17 kgce/CNY, and nine with intensity levels under 0.09 kgce/ 
CNY. Therefore, the energy-intensive group can be set safely to include only the top 
four industries, and then expanded by including one industry at a time sequentially 
according to their intensity levels, to explore the change of cross-industry and 
industry-specific effects of regulation. The nine industries with lowest intensity levels 
can be safely left out of the energy-intensive group throughout the analysis.  
Provincial energy-intensity targets change more continuously. Therefore, the 
demarcation between high and low regulation explored ranges from 0.08 CNY/kgce 




other 22 in the low regulation group to 22 in the high regulation group. Provinces are 
similarly added to the high-regulation group one at a time. 
Figure 5.2a and 5.2b show the annual general high-regulation effect on 
employment across industries and additional effect specifically on energy-intensive 
industries, respectively. Except using high-regulation and energy-intensive dummies 
for provinces and industries instead of energy-efficiency targets and industrial energy 
intensity, the rest of the regression specification follow that in column 4 of table 5.2. 
One point corresponds to one combination of demarcations for high regulation and 
for energy-intensive industries.  
The general high-regulation impacts across industries change from negative to 
positive when more provinces with laxer regulations are considered highly regulated 
(figure 5.2a). At the same time, the additional effects on energy-intensive industries 
change from little below zero to significantly negative (figure 5.2b). The general 
trends are far from smooth, indicating that the effective regulation level in each 
province is not linearly correlated with its energy-efficiency target specified in 
previous regressions. Some provinces with laxer targets actually experience more 
induced employment loss and contribute more to the pooled regulatory impact than 
some provinces with more stringent targets. With different specifications of energy-
intensive industries, the trends of general effects are parallel (figure 5.2a), while the 
trends of specific effects are crossing each other (figure 5.2b). They suggest that each 
province has different effective regulations on different industries, which are not 






Figure 5.2 Sensitivity of regulatory effects to classifying industries and provinces.  
More industries and provinces are sequentially included into the high categories: (a) 












































The general cross-industry high-regulation effects in figure 5.2a capture the 
differences between high-regulation associated change in industries other than 
energy-intensive ones and low-regulation associated change over all industries. The 
additional effects in figure 5.2b capture the differences between high-regulation 
associated changes in energy-intensive industries and other industries. Therefore, the 
large negative general effects and small negative or insignificant specific effects on 
the left-hand sides of the figures suggest that in a few provinces with extremely high 
regulation, the regulatory effects are dispersed evenly to most manufacturing 
industries. The insignificant general effects and significant negative specific effects 
under some specifications of industries in the middle of the figures suggest that 
provinces with moderate energy-efficiency targets regulate only some of their 
industries stringently. The positive general effects and negative specific effects on the 
right-hand side simply suggest that the high-regulation group is specified too broadly, 
so that the two types of effects captured are mainly industry-specific effects relative 
to the average. The previous estimation results with numerical measures correspond 
to somewhere in the middle of the figures with small, positive general effects, and 
negative industry-specific effects in larger magnitude.  
 
5.5.2 Nation-wide effect on energy intensive industries 
The previous subsection demonstrates that the direction and magnitude of 
cross-industry and industry-specific effects of high regulations depend on the 
specifications of high-regulation provinces and energy-intensive industries. Following 




provinces and industries, and applies a triple-difference estimation framework. Such 
estimation not only helps identify cross-industry and industry-specific effects 
between highly and lowly regulated regions, and thereby spatial relocation of 
industries, but also helps identify regulatory effect on energy-intensive industries 
throughout the country. The latter is driven by local regulations shared by all 
provinces and national-level regulations on specific industries, and may lead to 
industrial relocation outside China and carbon leakage in other countries. 
Assume that provinces with lax energy-saving targets only regulate energy-
intensive industries to fulfill their targets, so that other industries can be considered as 
a control group with no regulation. Energy-intensive industries in these provinces 
experience a treatment denoted as di = 1, which consists of both national-level 
regulations for these industries, and local regulations for these industries averaged 
over provinces with lax targets. In provinces with stringent targets, industries that are 
not energy-intensive experience a treatment denoted as dp = 1. The energy-intensive 
industries experience a treatment denoted as dpi = 1, which can be decomposed into a 
provincial treatment dp = 1 like other industries in the same provinces, an industrial 
treatment di = 1 like the same industries in other provinces, and an additional 
treatment denoted as di dp = 1, because the impact of dpi not necessarily equals the 
sum of provincial treatment due to tougher targets and industrial treatment shared by 
all provinces. With control variables omitted only for simple display, the regulatory 
effects on industrial employment can be represented as 




where αt is the change of control group through year, and β1t, β2t, and β3t are the year-
specific effect sizes of provincial, industrial, and additional treatments. Because the 
data are pooled into groups with sufficient observations for each group, the treatments 
can be estimated for each year specifically. The results can also help test the linear 
accumulation of regulatory effects assumed previously. 
Individual-level and provincial-level controls used in previous regressions are 
all kept. Instead of using industry-by-year fixed effects terms, industrial characters 
are explicitly incorporated for estimating the industrial treatment, especially those 
that may correlate with industrial energy intensity and energy-saving regulations. 
They include electricity consumption per production cost, ownership structure 
measured as percentage of employment in state-owned firms and percentage of 
employment in private firms, dependence on international market measured as export 
rate, general industrial business performance measured as percentage of loss-making 
firms, and foreign investment measured as capital input from foreign countries and 
capital input from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. The investment sources are 
differentiated following previous evidence about the association between 
environmental regulation and investment from ethnically Chinese sources (Dean et al. 
2009). In addition, year fixed effects are included.  
With a reference to the results from the previous section, only the provinces 
with extremely stringent regulations of energy-intensity targets below 0.084 kgce/ 
CNY are included in the high-regulation group. There are eight provincial equivalents 
– Beijing, Guangdong, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, Hainan, and Tianjin – 




targets between 0.084 and 0.11 kgce/CNY are removed, so that the low-regulation 
group is more distinctive from the high-regulation group, and comparably accounts 
for about 40% of the GDP. The distinction between the two groups also features the 
high regulation in the east coastal region, and the low regulation in other regions, 
especially the west. The energy-intensive group is more broadly defined to include 
industries with energy intensity above 0.13 kgce/CNY. They include nonmetallic 
mineral, ferrous metals, petroleum, raw chemical, nonferrous metals, paper, chemical 
fibers, textile, and metal products industries, accounting for 47% of the 2005 value-
added of the all studied industries. The two industrial groups also feature the 
distinction between heavy industries – those with large demand for natural resources 
and material processing – and light industries. 
Figure 5.3a-c show the high-regulation effect (β1t), cross-province effect on 
energy-intensive industries (β2t), and additional effect on energy-intensive industries 
under high regulation (β3t) in 2006-2010. High regulation is associated with 11% loss 
in employment in all manufacturing industries relative to low regulation. Energy-
intensive industries suffer 21% of employment loss nation-wide compared to other 
industries. There is no significant additional effect on energy-intensive industries 
under high regulation – their regulation-associated employment loss is 21% relative 
to other industries in the same provinces, and amounts to approximately 11% relative 




   
   
Figure 5.3 Regulation-associated change in employment with qualitative measures. 
(a) high-regulation impact across industries, (b) cross-province impact on energy-
intensive industries, (c) additional interactive impact on energy-intensive industries 
under high-regulation, with base year 2006 and lagged electricity data; (d) high-
regulatory impact across industries, (e) cross-province impact on energy-intensive 
industries, (f) additional interactive impact on energy-intensive industries under high-
regulation, with base year 2005 and  contemporary electricity data. Dashed lines 








Because the national-level regulation, which is assumed to affect energy-
intensive industries nation-wide, started from late 2005, the 2005 data is included to 
estimate the industrial treatment during 2005 and 2006, by using contemporaneous 
electricity data. The estimations for high-regulation effect, industrial effect, and 
additional interaction effect, shown in figure 5.3d-f, are -12%, -22%, and 
insignificant, respectively. The counterfactual effect of high regulation during 2005-
2006 – regulation associated employment change before the regulation was enforced 
– is positive and insignificant (figure 5.3d). Such a counterfactual result suggests a 
real causal relationship between high regulation and employment loss, rather than a 
correlation between regulation and employment loss in a reversed causal channel or 
through other variables. However, the positive associate between regulation and 
employment before 2006 may suggest an underestimation of the regulation-induced 
employment loss.  
The regulation-induced employment losses did not increase in a linear way as 
previous specified. Rather, both provincial and industrial employment declines 
occurred mostly in 2007 and 2009, and were moderate or even trivial in other years. 
The pattern may suggest that regulating agencies and industrial firms adapted their 
efforts according to previous performance in the process of fulfilling the 
performance-based energy-saving targets. 
 
5.6 Discussion and implication 
Results above demonstrate that during 2006-2010 energy-saving regulations 




provinces with high efficiency (low intensity) targets, most industries were affected; 
in provinces with lower targets, only a subset of energy-intensive industries was 
comparably affected. The provinces with higher targets and 40% of national GDP lost 
11% of manufacturing employment due to their tougher regulations relative to the 
provinces with lower targets and 40% of GDP. Nine energy-intensive industries lost 
21% employment relative to other industries nation-wide. Energy-intensive industries 
under high regulation experienced roughly the linear combination of the two impacts. 
In comparison, the regulation difference in the US CAAA, which mandate polluting 
firms to adopt “lowest achievable emission rates” technology in nonattainment 
counties, caused 10% employment loss in four years and a maximum 15% loss in 
eight years, in polluting industries in nonattainment counties relative to the same 
industries in attainment counties (Walker 2011).  
Electricity price also had a deterrent effect on a few industries with high 
electricity demand in production, but its estimated impact is less significant compared 
to the energy-saving regulation, and is in smaller magnitude compared to the effect in 
the US. This is because unlike direct regulations that control industry scale, higher 
electricity price also leads to input substitutions, which partially mitigate the 
regulatory effect. Abundant energy endowment, on the other hand, was a more 
significant factor for the location of all manufacturing industries, and its estimated 
impact is similar to that of energy-saving regulations. It is important to note that there 
is a spatial nexus of the three factors in China – stringent regulations, high electricity 




electricity price, and abundant energy supply in the west provinces, with few 
exceptions.  
The estimation may still understate the magnitude of regulatory impacts on 
employment loss. The unit of analysis in this research – two-digit industries in 
provinces – raises an aggregation bias. The two-digit industries are composed of less 
aggregated subsectors, and eventually plants, that are heterogeneous in their 
performance of energy consumption, and may face different costs of compliance. 
Similarly, provinces are composed of cities and counties, which have heterogeneous 
targets in 2010 even in the same province, based on their energy-intensity level in 
2005 and their negotiation with a higher level government. While the research 
captures the change of employment across provinces and two-digit industries, the 
more subtle changes within provinces and within industries are not captured. The 
latter might bring more location change than the estimation between east and west. 
In spite of the strong evidence of energy-related change of industry location, 
there is still no evidence of real employment loss in the provinces with high 
regulation, and associated transitional costs for reallocating production and labors. 
The main reason lies in the fast growth of the Chinese economy. Figure 5.4a shows 
the relative changes of the employment in the nine energy-intensive industries in the 
east and west. West provinces had essentially little employment increase before the 
spatially differentiated regulation was introduced at the end of 2006, but had more 
than 20% increases afterward. In the same period, east coastal provinces did not 
experience a real loss, but an increase at a slower pace – the employment increased 




relative change of the whole manufacturing employment as in figure 5.4b, east 
provinces still maintained a higher increase relative to the west, although with a 
smaller difference. The trends suggest that the comparative advantage in the east – for 
example, agglomeration economies, scale economies, access to foreign investment 
and knowledge spillovers – have been fully compensated by the energy-saving 
regulations after 2006 in the energy-intensive industries, and partly compensated in 
other manufacturing industries.  
 
 
Figure 5.4 Employment change in the east and west provinces relative to 2006 level. 






In the future, the location of energy-intensive industries between east and west 
may be further reversed, considering even more stringent energy-saving targets in the 
east after 2010. The central government enunciated another 16% reduction of energy 
intensity during 2011-2015, with similar provincial disaggregation, and committed 
40-45% reduction of CO2 emission per unit GDP by 2020 on the 2005 base. The 
continuation of spatially differentiated regulations may cause real relocation of 
employment and production from the east to the west, and transitional costs of 
reallocation the factors of production. In addition, research suggests high-regulation 
associated decline in productivity (Greenstone et al. 2012), which may make firms 
less competitive in the east coast, where the economy depends highly on export and 
competitiveness in the international market.  
The regulatory implications on the environment and energy saving are of 
greater concern. Previous research indicate that the location of industries in the east 
region helped reduce energy intensity because of the substitution of other production 
factors for energy (Zhao and Yin 2011), better infrastructure, and spatial nexus (Yu 
2012). The expanding energy-intensive industries in the west have less access to these 
factors of production, and less capability to reduce energy consumption in production. 
Particularly, the lax regulation in the west is more attractive to firms that are less 
willing to reduce their energy intensity in the east, which may be continuously less 
willing to make energy-saving efforts after the relocation. In addition to the energy 
consumption in production, the relocation of production capacities may increase the 
energy consumption in transportation, given that the major consumer market and 




Because the energy-intensive industries are usually pollution-intensive with high 
demand for natural resources, there are also considerable environmental 
consequences associated with the location of energy-intensive industries in the west.  
These potential consequences associated with energy-saving regulations direct 
future research to understand better the dynamic impacts of geographical distribution 
of industries on the demand for energy and natural resource and the environment, 
both globally and locally. By considering both policy-induced industry relocation and 
relocation associated environmental and economic consequences regionally and 
nationally, future policy making can better balance the national policy demand with 
local need, and set appropriate policy targets and assistance programs for technology 





Chapter 6 Conclusion and implications 
With growing policies related to climate change and GHG emissions, and 
commonly perceived large untapped potential for energy efficiency improvement, the 
choice of policy instruments to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels is a crucial 
research theme. Important considerations include the market and behavioral failures 
the policies may mitigate, policy effectiveness in practice, efficiency, as well as the 
distribution of policy impacts.  
This dissertation focuses on the recent energy saving policies in China and its 
major impact on the industrial sector. The policy is featured by the use of multiple, 
mixed policy instruments and spatially differentiated enforcement. Firms’ motivation 
and capabilities in the policy context are identified. The effectiveness and cost 
distribution of the policy and specific programs are explored.  
The case study research shows that the major motivation for firms to reduce 
energy consumption is to increase competitiveness and particularly lower cost. 
Another important motivation is legitimation, within the current policy context of 
seriously implemented energy-saving agreements and regional capacity control and 
elimination. Compared to corporate environmental behaviors, energy saving is not 
likely motivated by social responsibility. The widespread motivation for 
competitiveness and cost reduction through energy saving is further reflected in the 
firm level empirical research. The empirical results show that firms with no 
opportunity to develop new products and less expansion realized significantly more 
energy saving within their existing production capacity, and adopted new capitals 




products and greatly expanded their production. Those firms with less expansion also 
responded to the pressure of less individual profit, worse market, and higher 
electricity price by more reduction of energy intensity in production. These results 
suggest that the market-based policy, which has not yet been explicitly used in China, 
may be effective to firms by increasing their energy cost relative to other factors of 
production.  
The evidence of the effect of financial incentives particularly for energy 
efficiency investments is complicated. Detailed case study research shows that firms 
did not consider subsidies and rewards as important for decisions about efficiency 
investments, and enjoyed the policy benefits as free-riders. On the other hand, 
broader scale empirical evidence shows that energy intensity decrease in firms is 
positively correlated with the regional fiscal expenditures on energy saving, 
environment, and technologies. Therefore, the incentives are very likely effective, but 
the extent of their cost effectiveness and general efficiency need to be further 
explored.  
As identified in the case study research, energy-saving agreements and 
capacity elimination were major policy influences that associated with great energy 
saving efforts. The energy saving agreement was a key part of the Top-1000 program, 
which also provided information and technology support. The program was 
successful, not only because the policy target was overly fulfilled, but also because 
firms involved did not show significant behavioral heterogeneity in energy saving, as 
the literature usually suggested. While flexibility is permitted by the program, the 




calculated savings easily but in reality do not improve much of their efficiency level. 
This issue, however, will be mitigated by the recent introduction of absolute energy 
saving targets.  
A greater problem is the regionally differentiation in the setting of policy 
targets and enforcement of energy saving agreements and capacity regulations. The 
regional disparity in regulation stringency has directed the industry growth to regions 
with laxer regulations. Considering that these regions usually also have better energy 
endowment and lower electricity price, the trend of industry location to these regions 
is significant. Such locational effect should be taken into account in the policy design, 
by providing technology and financial assistance to regions with industries moving in 
so as to maintain local sustainability and encourage continuous energy saving. 
Market-based policy may also help mitigate the unintended industry relocation, 
because the empirical evidence shows that industries were more sensitive to 
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